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This paper analyzes a model of decision under ambiguity, deemed vector expected utility or VEU.
According to the proposed model, an act f :









u  f dm

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where u :X !R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, p is a baseline probability measure,
R

u  f dm is a adjustment vector of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite dimension, whose i-th component is
the Lebesgue integral
R
u  f dmi of the real function u  f with respect to a signed measure mi on 
,
and the function A is symmetric about zero: A(') = A( '). The signed measures (mi)0i<n encode
the possibility that ambiguity about certain events may (partially) “cancel out.” The adjustment term
A(
R
u  f dm) reﬂects the variability of the act f around its baseline expected utility
R
u  f dp.
A behavioral characterization of the VEU model is provided. Furthermore, an updating rule for
VEU preferences is proposed and characterized. The suggested updating rule facilitates the analysis
of sophisticated dynamic choice with VEU preferences.
1 Introduction
The issue of ambiguity in decision-making has received considerable attention in recent years, both
from a theoretical perspective and in applications to contract theory, information economics, ﬁnance,
and macroeconomics. As Daniel Ellsberg [13] ﬁrst observed, individuals may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to assign
probabilities to certain events when available information is deemed scarce or unreliable. In these cir-
cumstances, agents may avoid taking actions whose ultimate outcomes depend crucially upon the re-
alization of such ambiguous events, and instead opt for “safer” alternatives. Several decision models
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1have been developed to accommodate these patterns of behavior: these models represent ambiguity via
multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler [25]; Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [22]), non-additive
beliefs (Schmeidler [48]), second-order probabilities (Klibanoff, Mukerjee and Marinacci [34]; Nau [41];
Ergin and Gul [17]), relative entropy (Hansen and Sargent [29]; Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini [30]), or
variational methods (Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [37]).
ThispaperproposesadecisionmodelthatincorporateskeyinsightsfromEllsberg’soriginalanalysis,
as well as from cognitive psychology and recent theoretical contributions on the behavioral implications
of ambiguity. According to the proposed model, the individual evaluates uncertain prospects, or acts,
by a process suggestive of anchoring and adjustment (Tversky and Kahneman [56]). The “anchor” is the
expected utility of the prospect under consideration, computed with respect to a baseline probability;
the “adjustment” depends upon its variation away from the anchor at states that the individual deems
ambiguous. Formally, an act f , mapping each state ! 2 
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u  f dm is a adjustment vector of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite dimension, whose i-th component is
the Lebesgue integral
R
u  f dmi of the real function u  f with respect to a signed measure mi on 
;
and A is a symmetric function: A( ) = A() for every vector . I deem the proposed model vector
expected utility, or VEU. The main result of this paper is a behavioral characterization of preferences that
conform to the VEU model; an analysis of updating and dynamic choice for this family of preferences is
also provided.
Three key features of the VEU representation are worth emphasizing. First, prospects are evalu-
ated by means of a baseline prior, adjusted to account for ambiguity. Hillel Einhorn and Robin Hogarth
[11, 12, 31] were the ﬁrst to propose such an anchoring-and-adjustment strategy as a plausible approach
to decisions under ambiguity. The cited papers explore the implications of this strategy in a series of ex-
periments, dealing primarily with choice among binary lotteries. Ellsberg’s seminal paper also suggests
that, when faced with an ambiguous choice situation, “by compounding various probability judgments
ofvariousdegreesofreliability,[theindividual]caneliminatecertainprobabilitydistributionsoverstates
of nature as ‘unreasonable,’ assign weights to others and arrive at a composite ‘estimated’ distribution”
([13], p. 661; italics added for emphasis). Additional contributions emphasizing the role of reference
priors will be discussed in §5.1.
Second, decomposing the adjustment term in Eq. (1) into a suitable function A() and a collection
(mi)0i<n of signed measures provides a direct, explicit representation of eventwise complementarity—
a key behavioral feature of ambiguous events highlighted in the analysis of Larry Epstein and Jiankang
Zhang [15]. To illustrate this notion and provide a simple application of the decision model of Eq. (1),
2consider Ellsberg’s three-color urn experiment. A ball is to be drawn from an urn containing 30 red balls,
and 60 blue and green balls; the proportion of blue vs. green balls is unknown. Denote by fR, f B, fRG, fBG
the acts that yield $10 if a red (resp. blue, red or green, blue or green) ball is drawn, and $0 otherwise. As
reported by Ellsberg, the modal preferences are
fR  f B and fRG  f BG. (2)
Epstein and Zhang suggest that “[t]he intuition for this reversal is the complementarity between G and
B—there is imprecision regarding the likelihood of B, whereas fB,Gg has precise probability
2
3” ([15], p.
271). The proposed model enables a representation of the preferences in Eq. (2) that closely matches
this interpretation: let p be uniform on the state space 
=fR,G,Bg, assume w.l.o.g. that u is linear, and








Finally, let A() =  jj for every  2 R. Thus, in this example, n = 1: one-dimensional adjustment
vectors sufﬁce. The interpretation of the adjustment measure m0 is as follows: since A(m0(fGg)) =
A(m0(fBg), G and B are “equally ambiguous”; however, m0(fGg) + m0(fBg) = 0, so their ambiguities
“cancel out.” This algebraic cancellation corresponds to Epstein and Zhang’s notion of complementar-
ity. It is then easily veriﬁed that V(fR)=
10




3 , consistently with the
preferences in Eq. (2).1
Third, the symmetry property of the functional A (that is, the requirement that A(') = A( ') for
all vectors ') supports the intuition that the adjustment applied to the baseline expected-utility (EU)
evaluation of an act f is related to the variability, or dispersion, of the outcomes delivered by f at dif-
ferent states. In economic applications of decision models reﬂecting a concern of ambiguity, interesting
patterns of behavior often arise out of the agents’ desire to reduce outcome or utility variability (usually
referred to as “hedging” or “utility smoothing”); for instance, see Bose, Ozdenoren and Pape [5], Epstein
andSchneider[14], Ghirardatoand Katz[21], orMukerji[40]. Indeed, Schmeidler[48]suggeststhat “am-
biguity aversion” can be deﬁned as a preference for “smoothing or averaging utility distributions” [48,
p. 582]; other authors have further investigated this and related hedging-based characterizations of am-
biguity attitudes (for instance, Chateauneuf and Tallon [7]; Gilboa and Schmeidler [25]; Klibanoff [33];
Kopylov [36]; Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [37]). Thus, outcome or utility variability plays a key
role in the evaluation of acts under ambiguity; the VEU representation makes this role explicit.
To elaborate, recall that virtually all classical measures of variability or dispersion for random vari-
























2As well as the interquantile range for continuous random variables.
3Yitzhaki[58]), orthepeakednessordering(BickelandLehmann[4]), areinvarianttotranslationandsign
changes: foranyconstantc, therandomvariablesY andc Y areconsideredtobeequallydispersed. In-
tuitively, these measures reﬂect the extent of deviations from a reference point, or across different states,
rather than the direction of these deviations, or the location of the reference point itself.
In a decision setting à la Anscombe-Aumann [1], this invariance property may be translated as fol-
lows. Say that two acts f and ¯ f are complementary if their 50%:50% mixture is a constant act; it is easy
to see that, for a suitable constant c, the utility proﬁles of f and ¯ f satisfy u  ¯ f = c  u  f . Thus, com-
plementary acts exhibit the same utility or outcome variability according to classical measures. Hence,
if adjustments to the baseline evaluation of acts reﬂect their variability, then complementary acts should
receive the same adjustment. The symmetry property of the functional A ensures that this is the case.3
The main novel axiom in this paper, Complementary Independence, is chieﬂy responsible for this sym-
metry property.
One additional consequence of this property, and indeed of the Complementary Independence ax-
iom, deserves special emphasis. Symmetry implies that adjustment terms cancel out when comparing
two complementary acts using the VEU representation in Eq. (1); thus, the ranking of complementary
acts is effectively determined by their baseline EU evaluation. Conversely, preferences over complemen-
tary acts uniquely identify the baseline prior: there is a unique probability p and a cardinally unique
utility function u such that, for all complementary acts f and ¯ f , f ¼ ¯ f iff
R
u  f dp 
R
u  ¯ f dp. Thus,
baseline priors have a simple behavioral interpretation in the present setting: they provide a represen-
tation of the individual’s preferences over complementary acts. This implies that, under Complementary
Independence, the baseline prior is behaviorally identiﬁed independently of other elements of the VEU
representation; Sec. 4.4 elaborates on this point.
It is worth emphasizing that the functional representation in Eq. (1) is ﬂexible enough to accommo-
date a broad range of attitudes towards ambiguity, while at the same time allowing for numerical and
analytical tractability. The preferences in the preceding example display ambiguity aversion as deﬁned
by Schmeidler [48]; correspondingly, the adjustment function A is non-positive and concave. As will be
showninSec. 4.1, anon-positive, butnotnecessarilyconcaveadjustmentfunctioninsteadcharacterizes
ambiguity aversion in the more general sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci [24]. Indeed, the VEU model
can accommodate even more complex attitudes towards ambiguity; for instance, Sec. 4.5 provides a
simple, tractable (in particular, differentiable) representation of VEU preferences that exhibit ambiguity
appeal for small stakes and ambiguity aversion for large stakes—a pattern that has been documented in
experiments (e.g. Hogarth and Einhorn [31], Koch and Schunk [35]).
This paper also proposes a possible updating rule for VEU preferences, and provides a behavioral
3To further elaborate, recall that the signed measures (mi)0i<n in the VEU representation are assumed to satisfy mi(
) = 0;
thus, if f and ¯ f are complementary,
R
u  ¯ f dm= 
R
u  f dm. Since A is symmetric, A
R




u  ¯ f dm

.
4characterization. Consider an individual with VEU preference, represented by a baseline prior p, a col-
lectionofsignedmeasures(mi)0i<n,andafunctionalA asinEq. (1). Then,undersuitableassumptions,
upon learning that an event E has occurred, the individual again holds VEU preferences; her baseline
probability is the standard Bayesian update p(jE) of p, she employs the same adjustment functional A,
and the i-th updated signed measure mE,i is obtained from the corresponding measure mi by letting
mE,i(F)=mi(F \E)+p(FjE)mi(
nE)
for all events F. This characterization makes it possible to analyze sophisticated choice in dynamic de-
cision problems using a recursive formulation: this observation is developed in Sec. 4.2.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides preliminary deﬁnitions and results. Section 3
presents the main characterization result. Section 4 contains additional results and examples. Finally,
Section 5 discusses the related literature (§5.1), as well as additional features and extensions of the VEU
representation (§5.2). All proofs, as well as additional technical results, are in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Adjustment Tuples and Vectors
Consider a set 
 (the state space) and a sigma-algebra  of subsets of 
 (events). Adopt the following
conventional notation: for any interval  R, B0(, ) is the set of bounded, -measurable simple func-
tions on 
 taking values in  , and B(, ) is its sup-norm closure; if   = R, these sets will be denoted
simply as B0() and B(). The collection of bounded, countably additive measures on , is denoted by
ca(), whereas ca1() indicates the set of countably additive probability measures on (
,).
As noted in the Introduction, the VEU representation employs collections of signed measures to en-
code adjustments to the baseline EU evaluation of acts. Such “adjustment measures” are normalized so
as to reﬂect the fact that the empty event ; and the certain event 
 are not subject to ambiguity. These
collections can be ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite; in the latter case, adjustment measures are also required
to be uniformly bounded and uniformly continuous. The following deﬁnition provides the details, and
introduces additional, useful notation. Observe that, by Theorem 3.1, if the state space 
 is ﬁnite, then
VEU preferences can always be represented using ﬁnitely many adjustment measures.
Deﬁnition 1 An adjustment tuple of size n 2Z+ [f1g is a collection m =(mi)0i<n ca() such that
1. mi(
)=mi(;)=0 for 0i <n;
2. for every E 2 there exists N(E)2R such that jmi(E)j<N(E) for 0i <n; and
53. for all sequences (Ek)k0  with Ek  Ek+1 for all k 0 and
T
k Ek =;, sup0i<n jmi(Ek)j!0.
Denote the set of adjustment tuples of size n by Mn(). For every a 2 B() and m = (mi)0i<n 2 Mn(),











otherwise. For any interval  R, the range of m and   is the set R0(m, )=
¦R
a dm:a 2 B0(, )
©
.
Observation: adjustments as vector measures. Every adjustment tuple m =(mi)0i<n deﬁnes a count-
ably additive set function ^ m on  taking values in the Banach space `n
1 of supnorm-bounded n-vectors;
that is, ^ m is an `n
1–valued vector measure (cf. e.g. Dunford and Schwartz [10], §IV.10). Furthermore, for
every function a 2 B(), the (real-valued) vector
R
a dm deﬁned above coincides with the vector integral
of a with respect to ^ m (cf. [10], pp. 322-323). In other words,
R
a dm may equivalently viewed as a collec-
tion of scalar integrals, or as the integral of a with respect to a vector-valued measure. This connection is
made precise in Sec. A.1 of the Appendix; however, it is worth emphasizing that the results in this paper
do not depend upon the mathematics of vector measures.
2.2 Decision Setting and VEU representation
Consider a convex set X of consequences (outcomes, prizes). As in Anscombe-Aumann [1], X could
be the set of ﬁnite-support lotteries over some underlying collection of (deterministic) prizes, endowed
with the usual mixture operation. Alternatively, the set X might be endowed with a subjective mixture




 to X with ﬁnite range. With the usual abuse of notation, denote by x the constant act assigning
the consequence x 2X to each !2
. The main object of interest is a preference relation ¼ on L0.
AprecisedeﬁnitionoftheVEUrepresentationcannowbeprovided. Thefollowingnotationisuseful:
for a function u :X !R, u(X)=fu(x):x 2Xg; also, 0n denotes the zero vector in Rn (0n 1).
Deﬁnition 2 A tuple (u,p,n,m,A) is a VEU representation of a preference relation ¼ on L0 if
1. u :X !R is non-constant and afﬁne, p 2ca1(), n 2Z+ [f1g and m 2Mn();
2. A :R0(m,u(X))!R satisﬁes
(a) for all sequences ('k)k0 R0(m,u(X)) such that sup0i<n j'kj!0, A('k)!0;
(b) for all ' 2R0(m,u(X)), A(')=A( ');










and, for every pair of acts f ,g 2 L0,


















u  g dm

. (3)
Condition 2(a) implies the normalization A(0n) = 0 (take 'k = 0n for all k): if all ambiguity about an
act cancels out, then there is no adjustment to the baseline evaluation. Therefore, for general sequences
converging to 0n, this condition imposes supnorm-continuity at the origin. Condition 2(b) is the central
symmetry assumption discussed in the Introduction (cf. in particular Footnote 3).
Condition 3 ensures monotonicity of the VEU representation. Simple examples show that mono-
tonicity necessarily involves a joint restriction on p, m and A.4 In many cases of interest, easy-to-check
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions can be provided: see Appendix A.2 for details.
It is useful to point out that the functional A, and hence the entire VEU representation, is not re-
quired to be positively homogeneous. This makes it possible to accommodate, for instance, members
of the “variational preferences” family studied by Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [37] that satisfy
the key symmetry requirement of this paper; furthermore, it enables differentiable speciﬁcations of the
adjustment functional A, which would otherwise be precluded.
Finally, it is convenient to deﬁne a notion of “parsimonious” VEU representation. This is motivated
by the decision-theoretic notion of “crisp acts” due to Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [22]. Say
that an act f 2 L0 is crisp if, for every x 2X that satisﬁes f x, and for every g 2 L0 and 2(0,1],
g +(1 )x g +(1 )f . (4)
That is, a crisp act “behaves like its certainty equivalent”: in particular, as discussed in Ghirardato et
al. [22], it does not provide a “hedge” against the ambiguity that inﬂuences any other act g.5 Constant
acts are obviously crisp; correspondingly, any VEU representation of the preference ¼ assigns them the
zero adjustment vector. Since crisp acts behave like constant acts, it seems desirable to ensure that their
associated adjustment vector also be zero. This is the key requirement of the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3 A VEU representation (u,p,n,m,A) of a preference relation ¼ on L0 is sharp if
1. for any crisp act f 2 L0,
R
u  f dm=0n; and
4Refer to the three-color-urn example in the Introduction, and let f 0




B dm) < A(
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f B dm. Taking A(') = j'j instead shows that no general
assumption may be made regarding the direction of monotonicity for A alone.
5The present deﬁnition is weaker than the one provided by [22]: in particular, it allows for preferences that do not have a
positively homogeneous representation. The two deﬁnitions are equivalent if positive homogeneity holds.
72. if (u 0,p0,n0,m0,A0) is another VEU representation of ¼ that satisﬁes Condition 1, then n0 n.
As an immediate and intuitively appealing implication of Condition 1, note that, for an EU preference,
all acts are crisp; thus, the unique sharp VEU representation of an EU preference features n = 0, i.e. an
empty adjustment tuple.
It is sometimes convenient to employ VEU representations that are not sharp: see, for instance, the
analysis of updating in Sec. 4.2. However, a notion of sharp representation provides a way to assess the
complexity of the complementarity patterns that the individual perceives among ambiguous events. Ex-
ample 1 in the following section provides a simple application of these ideas, and a geometric intuition.
3 Axiomatic Characterization of VEU preferences
It will be useful to assume that (
,) is a standard Borel space (Kechris [32]): that is,  is the Borel sigma-
algebra generated by a Polish topology  on 
. This is best viewed as a structural assumption on the
sigma-algebra : the generating topology  plays no role in the analysis. All ﬁnite and countably inﬁnite
sets, as well as all Borel subsets of Euclidean n-space, are standard Borel spaces, as are many spaces of
functions that arise in the theory of continuous-time stochastic processes.
Mixtures, or convex combinations of acts are taken pointwise: for every pair of acts f ,g 2 L0 and for
any 2[0,1], f +(1 )g is the act assigning the consequence f (!)+(1 )g(!) to each state !2
.
Axioms 3.1–3.4 are standard:
Axiom 3.1 (Weak Order) ¼ is transitive and complete.
Axiom 3.2 (Monotonicity) For all acts f ,g 2 L0, f (!)¼ g(!) for all !2
 implies f ¼ g.
Axiom 3.3 (Continuity) For all acts f ,g,h 2 L0, the sets f2[0,1]:f +(1 )g ¼hg and f2[0,1]:h ¼
f +(1 )gg are closed.
Axiom 3.4 (Non-Degeneracy) Not for all f ,g 2 L0, f ¼ g.
Next,aweakformoftheAnscombe-Aumann[1]Independenceaxiom,duetoMaccheroni,Marinacci
and Rustichini [37], is assumed.
Axiom 3.5 (Weak Certainty Independence) For all acts f ,g 2 L0, x,y 2 X and  2 (0,1): f +(1 )x ¼
g +(1 )x implies f +(1 )y ¼g +(1 )y.
Loosely speaking, preferences are required to be invariant to translations of utility proﬁles, but not to
rescaling (note that the same weight  is employed when mixing withx and with y). As discussed in [37],
8this axiom weakens Gilboa and Schmeidler [25]’s Certainty Independence, which requires invariance to
both translation and rescaling. Since Certainty Independence will be referenced below, it is useful to
reproduce it here, even though it is not assumed in Theorem 3.1.
Axiom 3.5 (Constant-Act Independence) For all acts f ,g 2 L0, h 2 Lc and  2 (0,1): f ¼ g implies
f +(1 )h ¼g +(1 )h.
To ensure that all measures in the representation are countably additive, adopt the following axiom,
which is in the spirit of Arrow [2].6 A similar representation could be obtained without it, but it would
not be possible to restrict attention to adjustment vectors of ﬁnite or countably-inﬁnite dimension. To
state the axiom, for every pair x,y 2X and E 2, denote by xEy the act that yields x at every state !2 E
and y elsewhere.
Axiom 3.6 (Monotone Continuity) For all sequences (Ak)k1   such that Ak  Ak+1 and
T
k Ak = ;,
and all x,y,z 2X such that x y z, there is k 1 such that zAkx y xAkz.
In order to state the novel axioms in this paper, a preliminary deﬁnition is required. Intuitively, it
identiﬁes pairs of acts whose utility proﬁles are “mirror images.”














If two acts f , ¯ f 2 L0 are complementary, then (f , ¯ f ) is referred to as a complementary pair.
If preferences over X can be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u()—which
is the case under Axioms 3.1 through 3.5—then the utility proﬁles of the acts f and ¯ f , denoted u  f
and u  ¯ f respectively, satisfy u  ¯ f = k  u  f for some constant k 2 R. Thus, complementarity is the
preference counterpart of algebraic negation.
Notice that, if (f , ¯ f ) and (g, ¯ g) are complementary pairs of acts, then, for any weight  2 [0,1], the
mixtures f +(1 )g and  ¯ f +(1 ) ¯ g are themselves complementary.
The Complementary Independence axiom may now be formulated.
Axiom 3.7 (Complementary Independence) For any two complementary pairs (f , ¯ f ) and (g, ¯ g) in L0,
and all 2[0,1]: f ¼ ¯ f and g ¼ ¯ g imply f +(1 )g ¼ ¯ f +(1 ) ¯ g.
6Chateauneuf et al. [8] show that a similar (simpler) axiom delivers countable additivity of priors for -maxmin preferences.
Ghirardato et al. [22] obtain countable additivity for preferences that only satisfy the ﬁrst ﬁve axioms in the text by imposing
monotone continuity on a derived preference relation. Here, due to Axiom 3.7, it is possible to provide a simple axiom on the
primitive preference ¼, even if the latter is not a member of the -maxmin family.
9Axiom 3.7 is motivated by the intuition that VEU preferences rank acts according to a baseline EU
evaluation, adjusted to reﬂect a concern for utility or outcome variability around the baseline. Observe
ﬁrst that, for EU preferences, f ¼ ¯ f and g ¼ ¯ g imply that f +(1 )g ¼  ¯ f +(1 ) ¯ g regardless of
whether or not the acts under consideration are pairwise complementary; indeed, under Axioms 3.1—
3.4, this property is equivalent to the standard Independence axiom, and hence characterizes EU prefer-
ences. Next, recall that complementary acts are “mirror images” of each other; therefore, as noted in the
Introduction,virtuallyallclassicalmeasuresofdispersionforrandomvariableswouldattributethemthe
same variability. But, if adjustments reﬂect a concern for variability, complementary acts should then
be subject to the same adjustment. Therefore, preferences over complementary acts cannot be driven
by differences in their adjustments: pairwise complementary acts are effectively ranked consistently with
their baseline evaluation. Axiom 3.7 then reﬂects an observable implication of the assumption that such
baseline evaluations conform to EU.
A ﬁnal axiom is required:
Axiom 3.8 (Complementary Translation Invariance) For all complementary pairs (f , ¯ f ), and all x, ¯ x 2










Similarly to Complementary Independence, Axiom 3.8 captures a behavioral implication of the as-
sumption that the adjustment applied to the baseline EU evaluation of complementary acts is the same.
Observe ﬁrst that, if the preference relation ¼ is consistent with EU, the property in the Axiom holds
regardless of whether or not f and ¯ f are complementary. Indeed, a stronger property holds for EU pref-
erences: if the prizes x and ¯ x are “translated” in utility space by the same amount, thereby obtaining









2y. If now the individual evaluates the
complementary acts f and ¯ f by applying the same adjustment to their baseline evaluation, then the
prizes x  f and ¯ x  ¯ f will differ from the baseline evaluation of f and ¯ f by the same utility shift, intu-









2x are ranked according to the individual’s baseline preference, because they are complementary.
Therefore, if baseline preferences are consistent with EU, the preceding observation implies that these
mixtures should be indifferent, as required by the Axiom.
Complementary Translation Invariance should be viewed as less central to the characterization of
VEU preferences than Complementary Independence (Axiom 3.7). Indeed, Axiom 3.8 is redundant in
two important cases. First, Axiom 3.8 is implied by Axioms 3.1–3.5 and 3.7 if the utility function rep-
resenting preferences over X is unbounded either above or below,7 as is the case for the majority of
7A proof is available upon request. Also note that unboundedness of the utility function follows from well-known behavioral
axioms: see e.g. [37].
10monetary utility functions employed in applications. Second, regardless of the utility function, if prefer-
encessatisfyAxioms3.1–3.4and3.5 (insteadofAxiom3.5), thenitistrivialtoverifythattheindifference
requiredby Axiom3.8 holdsregardless ofwhether ornot f and ¯ f arecomplementary; inother words, Ax-
iom 3.8 is automatically satisﬁed by all “invariant biseparable” preferences à la Ghirardato, Maccheroni
and Marinacci [22].8 Thus, Axiom 3.8 is only required to accommodate preferences that simultaneously
violate Axiom 3.5 and are represented by a bounded utility function on X.9
The main result of this paper can now be stated.
Theorem 3.1 Consider a preference relation ¼ on L0. The following statements are equivalent:
(1) The preference relation ¼ satisﬁes Axioms 3.1–3.8.
(2) ¼ admits a sharp VEU representation (u,p,n,m,A).
(3) ¼ admits a VEU representation (u,p,n,m,A).
In (2), if (u 0,p0,n0,m0,A0) is another VEU representation of ¼, then p0 =p, u 0 =u + for some , 2R
with >0, and there exists a linear surjection T :R0(m0,u 0(X))!R0(m,u(X)) such that






















If (p,u 0,n0,m0,A0) is sharp, then n =n0 and T is a bijection. Finally, if 
 is ﬁnite, then n j
j 1.
The primary message of Theorem 3.1 is the equivalence of (1) and (2): Axioms 3.1–3.8 are equivalent
to the existence of a sharp VEU representation. However, as noted in Sec. 2.2, it is sometimes convenient
to employ VEU representations that are not sharp. Theorem 3.1 ensures that the resulting preferences
will still satisfy Axioms 3.1–3.8. To put it differently, if a preference admits a VEU representation, then it
also admits a sharp VEU representations.
The second part of Theorem 3.1 indicates the uniqueness properties of the VEU representation. In
particular, the baseline probability measure p is unique, and the adjustment tuple m and function A are
uniqueuptotransformationsthatpreserveboththeafﬁnestructureofthesetR0(m,u(X))ofadjustment
vectors, as well as the actual adjustment associated with each element in that set.
To elaborate, recall that the role of the adjustment tuple m is to capture the patterns of “complemen-
tarity” among different events; for instance, if ambiguity about two events E and F cancels out, then
8This broad class includes for instance all multiple-priors, -maximin, and Choquet-Expected Utility preferences.
9Imposing unbounded utility functions, or the full Certainty Independence axiom, seems too high a price to pay to dispense
with Axiom 3.8, especially because none of the main results in this paper require these stronger assumptions.
11m(E)+m(F)=0.10 In order for another measure m0 to capture the same complementarities as the mea-
sure m, it must be the case that also m0(E)+m0(F)=0. Similarly, complementarities among adjustment
vectors associated with different acts must be preserved. The existence of a functional T with the prop-
erties listed in Theorem 3.1 ensures this. As the following example illustrates, this imposes considerable
restrictions on transformations of a given adjustment that can be deemed inessential.
Example 1 Refer to the ambiguity-averse VEU preferences described in the Introduction in the context
of the Ellsberg Paradox. In particular, recall that 
=fR,B,Gg and m0(fRg)=0, m0(fBg)= m0(fGg)=
1
3;
the fact that the latter two adjustments have opposite signs indicates that ambiguity about B and G
“cancels out.” Now let m =(m0), so n =1; indeed, note that R(m,u(X)) is the entire real line.




2 for all ' 2 R2. Suppose
there exists a map T as in Theorem 3.1. The fact that A0 = A T implies that, in particular, A0(m0(fRg)) =
A(T(m0(fRg))) = A(m(fRg)) = 0, so m0(fRg) = 0. Similarly, T(m0(fB,Gg)) = m(fB,Gg) = 0, so A0 = A T
implies A0(m0(fB,Gg))=0, and so m0(fBg)= m0(fGg). Finally, A0(m0(fBg))=
1
3 =A0(m0(fGg)).
In other words, m0 encodes exactly the same information about B and G as m: the two events are
equally ambiguous, but their ambiguities “cancel out”. Of course, m does so in a more parsimonious
way. This can also be seen geometrically: m0(fBg) and m0(fBg) are opposite points on a circle centered
at the origin with radius equal to
1
3, and R(m0,u(X)) is a line through the origin. This intuitively suggests




This section analyzes ambiguity aversion for VEU preferences. Two established deﬁnitions of this con-
cept are considered: the ﬁrst, due to Schmeidler [48], identiﬁes ambiguity aversion with a preference for
mixtures; the second, due to Ghirardato and Marinacci [24], captures a wider range of aversive attitudes
towards ambiguity, and turns out to have a natural characterization for VEU preferences.
BeginwithSchmeidler’sclassicalaxiom. Intuitively, anindividualwhoisambiguity-averseaccording
to the proposed deﬁnition values mixtures because they “smooth” utility proﬁles (cf. Schmeidler [48, p.
582]; Klibanoff [33, p. 290]). This has an straightforward characterization for VEU preferences, stated
below as a Corollary to the main representation result provided in Sec. 3.
Axiom 4.1 (Ambiguity Aversion) For all acts f ,g 2 L0 and 2(0,1): f  g implies f +(1 )g ¼ g.
10Here and in the following, for any adjustment tuple m and event E, m(E)=
R
1E dm=(mi(E))0i<n.
12Corollary 4.1 Consider a preference relation ¼ on L0 for which (1) in Theorem 3.1 holds, and let A be as
in (2). Then ¼ satisﬁes Axiom 4.1 if and only if A is non-positive and concave.
Thus, as expected, Axiom 4.1 implies that the adjustment functional is non-positive and concave.
However, for VEU preferences, it seems intuitive to associate non-positive, but not necessarily concave
adjustment terms with a form of ambiguity aversion. It turns out that this notion is precisely captured
by Ghirardato and Marinacci’s “comparative” deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 5 Given two preference relations ¼1 and ¼2 on L0, say that ¼1 is comparatively ambiguity-
averse iff ¼2 is consistent with expected utility and, for all f 2 L0 and x 2X,
f ¼1 x ) f ¼2 x.
The reader is directed to [24] for a discussion of this deﬁnition. Finally, comparative ambiguity aversion
can also be characterized using weaker forms of Axiom 4.1 for VEU preferences.
Axiom 4.2 (Simple Ambiguity Aversion) Forallcomplementarypairs(f , ¯ f )andprizesx, ¯ x 2X suchthat















¯ f ¼ f .
Both axioms have the standard hedging interpretation, but concern complementary pairs, rather than
arbitrary pairs of acts. Axiom 4.3 is related to Chateauneuf and Tallon’s “diversiﬁcation” property (see
[7]). The main result of this subsection can now be stated.
Proposition 4.2 Let ¼ be a preference relation with VEU representation (u,p,n,m,A). Then the follow-
ing statements are equivalent:
(1) ¼ is comparatively ambiguity-averse.
(2) ¼ satisﬁes Axiom 4.2.
(3) For all f 2 L0, A(
R
u  f dm)0.
If u(X) is unbounded above or below, or if ¼ satisﬁes Axiom 3.5, then (1)–(3) are equivalent to
(4) ¼ satisﬁes Axiom 4.3.
Example 2 Let 
 = f!1,!2,!3g and X = R, and a preference ¼ with VEU representation (u,p,2,m,A),






, and A(') =
 min(j'0j,j'1j). It is easy to verify that (u,p,2,m,a) satisﬁes Def. 2; in particular, A is differentiable
everywhere except at points where it takes the value 0, so Remark A.1 in the Appendix and the assumed
restrictions on  imply that the monotonicity requirement is met.
13These preferences are comparatively ambiguity-averse by Proposition 4.2; however, they do not sat-
isfy the standard Ambiguity Aversion axiom (i.e. Axiom 4.1): for instance, if u  f = [1,0,0] and u  g =




2g  f .
4.2 Updating
The theory developed so far only applies to one-period choice problems. This section proposes an up-
dating rule for VEU preferences; sophisticated dynamic choice is brieﬂy discussed in §4.3. Throughout
this subsection, two binary relations on L0 will be considered: ¼ denotes the individual’s ex-ante pref-
erences, whereas ¼E denotes her preferences conditional upon the event E 2 . To keep notation to a
minimum, the event E will be ﬁxed throughout.
As for conditional EU preferences, to ensure that updating is well-deﬁned, it is necessary that the
conditioning event E “matter” for the individual. This leads to the following standard requirement.
Axiom 4.4 (E is not null) There exist acts f ,g 2 L0 such that f (!)= g(!) for all !62 E and f  g.
Due to symmetry, the above requirement has a straightforward characterization for VEU preferences.
Remark 4.1 Let ¼ be a VEU preference, with baseline prior p. Then Axiom 4.4 holds iff p(E)>0.
As is the case for conditional EU preferences, it will be assumed throughout that the evaluation of
acts upon learning that the event E has occurred does not depend upon the consequences that might
have been obtained if, counterfactually, E had not obtained. This leads to the following, standard axiom.
Axiom 4.5 (Conditional Preference) For all f ,g 2 L0: if f (!)= g(!) for all !2
nE, then f E g.
The main axiom of this section can be informally stated as follows: if two acts have the same baseline
evaluation both ex-ante and conditional upon E, and the outcomes they deliver differ from the baseline
onlyontheevent E,thentheirex-anteandconditionalrankingshouldbethesame. Thisisconsistentwith
theproposedinterpretationofVEUpreferences. ConsideranindividualwhosepreferencesareVEUboth
ex-ante and conditional on E. Upon learning that E has occurred, her evaluation of an act f may change
for two reasons: the baseline EU evaluation of f may change, and outcome variability in states outside
E no longer matters. But if one restricts attention to acts for which the baseline evaluation does not
change upon conditioning on E, and which exhibit no variation away from the baseline at states outside
E tobeginwith,itseemsplausibletoassumethattheindividual’sevaluationofsuchactswillnotchange.
These special acts can be characterized by a behavioral condition that, once again, involves the no-
tion of complementarity. Consider two complementary acts h, ¯ h 2 L0 that are constant on 
nE: that is,
14h(!)=h(!0) and ¯ h(!)= ¯ h(!0) for all !,!0 2














If the preference relation ¼ happens to be consistent with EU, then Eq. (6), together with complemen-
tarity, readily imply that h  h(!) for any (hence all) ! 2 
nE.11 This indicates that h(!) is a certainty
equivalent of h ex-ante. However, intuitively, h(!) can also be viewed as a “conditional certainty equiva-
lent” of h given E: since h(!0)=h(!) for all !0 2
nE, the ranking h h(!) suggests that receiving h(!)
for sure at states in E is just as good for the individual as allowing the act h to determine the ultimate
prize she will receive conditional upon E.12 Thus, for an EU preference, Eq. (6) implies that the act h has
the same certainty equivalent both ex-ante and conditional upon E.
For general VEU preferences, the above intuition obviously does not apply: it may well be the case
that h 6 h(!) for ! 2 
 n E. However, recall that Complementary Independence (Axiom 3.7) implies
that VEU preferences always rank complementary acts in accordance with their baseline EU evaluation.
Since the mixture acts in Eq. (6) are complementary, the above intuition does apply to the EU preference
determined by the individual’s baseline prior. One then concludes that, if Eq. (6) holds, then h(!) is a
baseline certainty equivalent of h, both ex-ante and conditional upon E; this is formally veriﬁed in the
proof of Proposition 4.3. Furthermore, it is clear that h deviates from this baseline only at states in E.
Thus, Eq. (6) identiﬁes the class of acts that should be ranked consistently by prior and conditional VEU
preferences.
Axiom 4.6 (Baseline-Variation Consistency)
For all complementary pairs (f , ¯ f ) and (g, ¯ g) such that f , ¯ f ,g, ¯ g are constant on 


















2 ¯ g +
1
2g(!): f ¼E g if and only if f ¼ g.
Proposition 4.3 Consider a preference relation ¼ on L0 having a VEU representation (u,p,n,m,A), an
event E 2 , and another binary relation ¼E on L0. Assume that ¼E is complete and transitive, and that
Axiom 4.4 holds. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) Axioms 4.5 and 4.6 hold;




, where mE =(mi,E)0i<n satisﬁes


























¯ h(!). Invoking Independence once more yields h(!)h.
12Indeed,thisconditionmaybeusedtocharacterizeBayesianupdatingforEUpreferences,aswellasprior-by-priorBayesian
updating for MEU preferences: see Pires [42].
15In other words, under the proposed axioms, the updated preference is also VEU; its baseline proba-
bility is the Bayesian update of the prior, the functional A and utility u are unchanged, and the posterior
adjustment tuple mE is obtained from the prior tuple by Eq. (7). It should be noted that the resulting
VEU representation is not necessarily sharp, even if the ex-ante representation is.
To gain some intuition for the updating rule in Eq. (7), consider a probability measure  2 ca1().
Standard Bayesian updating on an event E 2  may be viewed as a process whereby the mass (
n E)
placed on the event that did not obtain is redistributed to states in E. In particular, since
8F 2, (FjE)=(F \E)+(FjE)(
nE),
the Bayesian updating process can be seen as adding a fraction (FjE) of the mass (
nE) to the ex-ante
probability mass of F \E. It should then be clear that Eq. (7) performs a similar operation, except that it
adds fractions of the “mass” m(
nE) to the “mass” m(F \E).
The updating rule in Eq. (7) satisﬁes convenient and natural properties of conditional measures.
Fix an adjustment tuple m 2 Mn(); it is immediate to verify that mi,E(E) = 0 for every index i: this
is the conditional counterpart of the normalization property mi(
) = 0 for unconditional adjustment
measures. Furthermore, a version of the “law of iterated conditioning” holds. Fix three events E,F,G 2
such that G  F  E, and for all i 2 f0,...,n  1g, let mi,E,F be the signed measure obtained from mi,E
by applying Eq. (7). Then mi,E,F(G) = mi,F(G) for all indices i. That is: conditioning on E ﬁrst, then
conditioning the resulting measure on F yields the same tuple of signed measures as conditioning on F
directly. This property is shared by some, but not all updating rules for known decision models under
ambiguity: for instance, the “maximum-likelihood” rule for multiple-priors preferences (cf. Gilboa and
Schmeidler [26]) violates it.
4.3 Recursion: An Example
The conditional preferences derived in Proposition 4.3 only satisfy a weak form of dynamic consistency.
Thus, the proposed updating rule must be complemented with a criterion, such as consistent planning
(Strotz [54]), to resolve possible conﬂicts between the ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of future choices.
However, theupdatingruleaxiomatizedintheprecedingsectionallowsforarecursive formulationofthe
consistent-planning problem. This section sketches the basic idea, and then illustrates it by means of a
simple example; a full treatment is left for future work.
It is immediate to verify that, if F   is a ﬁnite partition of 
, and for every E 2 F the tuple mE is















E a dp(jE) and
R
E a dmE for all E 2F, just like the baseline
R
a dp can be obtained
from the conditional baseline integrals.
Thissuggestsarecursiveapproachtothesolutionofdynamicdecisionproblemsviaconsistentplan-
ning. Loosely speaking, the conditional integrals
R
E a dp and
R
E a dmi,E are part of the VEU “value func-
tion” obtained by solving the one-step-ahead problem; these can be plugged into the current-period
problem, as is the case for EU preferences. Example 3 below illustrates this approach in a very simple
setting with two decision epochs.
To conclude, note that, if there are more than two decision epochs, posterior adjustment measures
can be constructed in two equivalent ways, because the proposed updating rule satisﬁes the law of iter-
ated conditioning. It is of course possible to ﬁx a prior adjustment tuple on the entire state space, and
derive from it the relevant time-t conditional adjustment tuples by applying Eq. (7). However, alter-
natively, adjustment tuples can be constructed by iterated one-step-ahead conditioning, which may be
especially convenient if uncertainty has a Markov structure.







are evaluated by discounting at the rate  2(0,1). The output of the sole productive activity in the econ-
omy is characterized by a rate of return that can be either rH or rL < rH. At the beginning of periods
t = 0,1, given her current wealth wt, the agent sets the quantity st to be saved, and consumes the rest;
then the rate of return rt is realized, and the period ends. At the beginning of the following period,
wt+1 =strt. At time t =2 there is no decision to be made: the agent consumes the entire output.
To describe the possible realizations of the production process at times 0 and 1, let 
 = f(r0,r1) :
r0,r1 2frH,rLgg. Assume a uniform baseline p, and an adjustment given by
n =1, m0(f(rH,rH)g)=m0(f(rL,rL)g)== m0(f(rH,rL)g)= m0(f(rL,rH)g) and A()= jj
with 0   
1
4. This is one of the simplest possible speciﬁcations for the problem under consideration;
it is inspired by the analysis of dilation in Seidenfeld and Wasserman [49]. Intuitively, the agent does not
perceive any ambiguity about the marginal probability of high or low returns in either period; however,
there is ambiguity about the correlation of outcomes.
Letting Ht = f(r0,r1) : rt = rHg and similarly for Lt, and applying Eq. (7), we get m0,H0(H1) =  =
 m0,H0(L1) and similarly m0,L0(H1) =   =  m0,L0(L1). Thus, after observing the realization of time-0
















17(here and in the following, the term corresponding to the current payoff does not appear in the adjust-




2  ; then, simple (and standard) manipulations show that
s1(w1) = 1w1, (10)
V
p












where the constants 1, 1 and m
1 depend upon the parameters 
,,,rL,rH but not on w1. The results
in Eqs. (10) and (11) are well-known; note however that a similarly convenient expression is obtained for
the adjustment “vector” V m
1,H(w1). Finally, if r0 = rL, the agent solves a problem similar to that in Eq. (9),
except that the adjustment vector is V m
1,L(w1)  [ v(rHs1)+v(rLs1)] =  V m
1,H(w1); this clearly leads to
the same solution and baseline utility.
It is now possible to contrast the direct approach to sophisticated choice and the recursive approach
suggested by Eq. (8). In the direct approach, time-0 savings s0 are determined by maximizing the entire
ex-ante VEU functional, substituting for the optimal time-1 choice as a function of savings in time 0 and
































Taking a recursive approach instead, invoking Eq. (8) and taking care to discount appropriately, at time


























which, substituting for V
p
1 , V m























Even in this very simple example, the objective function in Eq. (14) is slightly easier to analyze than
Eq. (13); also, Eq. (14) shows that the time-0 problem is structurally analogous to the time-1 problem,
except that the “discount factor” is 1. Arguing as in the time-1 problem, the agent behaves as if the





1 ;13 optimal time-0 savings are then given by s0 = 0w0, where 0
has an expression analogous to 1.
13It turns out that 
m
1 < 0 for 
 > 1; since v is increasing, j
m
1 [v(rHs0) v(rLs0)]j =  
m
1 [v(rHs0) v(rLs0)]. Also, in the





184.4 Complementary Independence for Other Decision Models
This section investigates the implications of the Complementary Independence axiom for certain well-
known preference models. It will be shown that this axiom makes it possible to identify a baseline prior
frombehavioralprimitives, independentlyofthefunctionalrepresentationofpreferences. Furthermore,
the speciﬁc role of this prior in the different models under consideration will be clariﬁed.14
Begin with what are perhaps the two best-known models of decision under ambiguity: the maxmin-
expected utility (MEU) or multiple-priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [25], and Schmeidler’s [48]
Choquet-expected utility (CEU) model. A MEU preference is characterized by a utility function u and a
weak closed, convex setC ba1() of probability charges; the representing functional can be written as
I u : L0 ! R, where I(a) = minq2C
R
a dq for all a 2 B0(). Also recall that a capacity is a set function
v :  ! [0,1] such that (1) v(;) = 0 and v(
) = 1, and (2) A,B 2  and A  B imply v(A)  v(B). A CEU
preference is represented by the functional Iv u : L0 !R, where Iv is the Choquet integral with respect
to the capacity v (see [48]).
Preferences conforming to these models satisfy Axioms 3.1–3.4 and Certainty Independence (Axiom
3.5), which is stronger than Axiom 3.5. MEU preferences additionally satisfy Axiom 4.1, Ambiguity Aver-
sion; CEU preferences satisfy a stronger independence axiom, deemed Comonotonic Independence.
Proposition 4.4 (Complementary Independence for MEU and CEU preferences)
(1) AMEUpreference¼satisﬁesAxiom3.7ifandonlyifthereisp 2C suchthat,forallq 2C,2p q 2C
(that is, p is the barycenter of C).
(2) A CEU preference ¼ satisﬁes Axiom 3.7 if and only if there is p 2 ba1() such that, for all E 2 ,
v(E)+[1 v(
nE)]=2p(E).
In (1) and (2), p 2ba1() is the unique probability charge that satisﬁes f ¼ ¯ f ,
R
u  f dp
R
u  ¯ f dp for
all complementary pairs (f , ¯ f ), where u is the utility function in the MEU or CEU representation of ¼.
Thus, for both MEU and CEU preferences, Complementary Independence identiﬁes a baseline prior
that, as in the VEU model, represents preferences over complementary acts. Observe that the set func-
tion E 7! 1 v(
nE) is also a capacity, sometimes denoted ¯ v and referred to as the dual of the capacity




2 ¯ v =p.
Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [22] provide a general representation for the family of prefer-
ences that satisfy the MEU axioms minus Ambiguity Aversion. As a preliminary step in the proof of the
14The models considered here are consistent with the axioms in Sec. 3, but the results provided here do not rely on this.
19main characterization result (Theorem 3.1), the present paper extends the Ghirardato et al. representa-
tion to preferences that satisfy the weaker Axiom 3.5 in lieu of Certainty Independence. The interested
reader is referred to Sec. B.2 in the Appendix.
Turn now to the variational preferences characterized by Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [37]:
given a utility function u :X !R,
f ¼ g , min
q2ba1()
Z





u  g dq+c(q)

,
where, denoting by x f a certainty equivalent of the act f for every f 2 L0, the function c : ba1() !






u  f dq

.
Maccheroni et al. [37] show that variational preferences are characterized by Axioms 3.1–3.4 and Ambi-
guity Aversion (Axiom 4.1). The following result shows that Complementary Independence corresponds
to a natural symmetry property of the “cost function” c, and again identiﬁes a unique baseline prior.
Proposition 4.5 (Complementary Independence for Variational Preferences) Let¼beavariationalpref-
erence, and assume that the utility function u is unbounded either above or below. Then ¼ satisﬁes
Axiom 3.7 if and only if there exists p 2ba1() such that
8q 2ba1(), 2p  q 2ba1())c(q)=c(2p  q) and 2p  q 62ba1())c(q)=1.
In particular, c(p)=0. Finally, p is the unique probability charge such that, for all complementary pairs
(f , ¯ f ), f ¼ ¯ f ,
R
u  f dp
R
u  ¯ f dp.
The reader is referred to [37] for a discussion of the unboundedness assumption.
4.5 More Examples
4.5.1 Variation and distance-based adjustments
As can be expected in light of the discussion in the Introduction, a natural class of VEU preferences is
obtained by adopting one of the standard measures of dispersion as the adjustment function A. This
subsection discusses interesting special cases, corresponding to the combination of speciﬁc dispersion
measures with speciﬁc adjustment tuples.
Assume ﬁrst, for simplicity, that 
 is ﬁnite, let  = 2
, and write 
 = f!0,...,!ng; correspondingly,
identify ba1() with (
)  fp 2 Rn+1
+ :
Pn
i=0pi = 1g, the unit simplex in Rn+1. Fix a strictly positive
20baseline probability p 2 (
). Grant and Kaji [27] consider the preference functional I : B0() ! R
deﬁned by


















they show that I is monotonic provided mini pi 
2
1+2, in which case the resulting preferences are con-
sistentwiththeMEUmodel. ItiseasytoseethatthesepreferencesalsosatisfyComplementaryIndepen-
dence, and are thus also VEU preferences; in particular, a corresponding adjustment tuple m 2 Mn()








measured by the Gini mean difference (Yitzhaki [58]; Yitzhaki and Olkin [59]), monotonicity is preserved.
In particular, for an arbitrary measurable space (







is monotonic for all  2[0,1] (cf. [59], Eqs. 3.1 and 3.2), and characterizes well-deﬁned VEU preferences.
If 
 is ﬁnite, the adjustment term can be represented via the adjustment tuplem =(mij)i6=j 2Mn(n+1)()
such that mij(f!ig) = 1 =  mij(f!jg) and mij(f!kg) = 0 for all k 6= i,j, together with the function







A different class of ambiguity-averse VEU preferences can be constructed via distance functions.
Again assume that 
 is ﬁnite, ﬁx a baseline probability p 2 (
), and consider a constant  > 0 such
that pi  p(f!ig) >  for every i = 0,...,n. Now deﬁne an adjustment tuple m 2 Mn(
) and a corre-
sponding adjustment function A : Rn+1 ! R by mi(f!ig) =
n
n+1 and mi(f!jg) =  
1
n+1 for all i and
j 6=i, and A(')= 
pPn
i=0'2


























Notice that the VEU preferences deﬁned by (u,p,n,m,A) are differentiable everywhere except “at cer-
tainty.” It turns out that the resulting preferences are also consistent with the MEU decision model:
Remark 4.2 For every a 2Rn+1, I(a)=minq2C
R








214.5.2 Ambiguity Attitudes and Outcome Size
In the examples considered so far, the individual’s ambiguity attitudes are qualitatively the same for
all acts under consideration: in particular, for a VEU decision-maker with baseline prior p and utility
function u who is ambiguity-averse in the sense of Def. 5, the certainty equivalent of every act f is
not greater than its “unambiguous” certainty equivalent u  1
R
u  f dp

. However, there is evidence
thatsomeindividualsmightbeambiguity-seeking whencontemplatingsmall-stakebets,andambiguity-
averse when considering large bets. For instance, this is documented in recent experimental work by
KochandSchunk[35]; earlierevidencealongthesamelinescanbefoundinHogarthandEinhorn[31].15
Incidentally, an analogous pattern has been broadly documented in the setting of risky choice: subjects
display risk-seeking attitudes when stakes are low, and risk-averse behavior for larger bets (Prelec and
Lowenstein [43] deem this the “peanuts effect”).
I now indicate a possible VEU representation of this preference pattern. The cited experiments deal
with draws from an urn of unknown composition, so it is enough to consider the state space 
=f!,!0g;
for simplicity, the baseline probability p will be taken to be uniform, and utility will be assumed linear.
It is sufﬁcient to consider a scalar adjustment m 2M1(


























, and has a unique (positive) maximum at
either side of zero; for values of ' outside this interval, it becomes negative. Notice that this function is
differentiable everywhere, and its derivative lies between  1 and 1; by Remark A.1 in the Appendix, the
VEU preferences characterized by (u,p,1,m,A) will be monotonic if p(E)jm(E)j for all events E.
Take t =3 and m(f!g)= m(f!0g)=0.2, and consider the acts f ,g such that
f (!)=10, g(!)=1000, f (!0)= g(!0)=0.
Intuitively, f corresponds to a “small” bet on the event that ! occurs, whereas g is a “large” bet on the
same event. The “unambiguous” certainty equivalents of these acts are, respectively,
R
f dp = 5 and
R
g dp=500; the certainty equivalent of f is approximately 5.33>5, whereas the certainty equivalent of
g is 491.71 < 500. Thus, this individual displays ambiguity-seeking preferences for the small bet f , and
ambiguity-averse behavior for the large bet g.16
15Speciﬁcally, Table 4 in [31] shows that the fraction of subjects who display ambiguity-averse preferences in the experiments
under consideration increases with outcome size; the subsequent discussion on p. 798 indicates that subjects not classiﬁed as
ambiguity-averse are to be considered ambiguity-seeking. Hence, there a fraction of subjects must display ambiguity-seeking
preferences for small stakes, and switch to ambiguity-averse behavior for large stakes.
16More generally, whenever g(!) > 20, the certainty equivalent of g is smaller than its unambiguous certainty equivalent
500; and whenever f (!)<20, the certainty equivalent of f is greater than 5.
225 Discussion
5.1 Related Literature
In the context of choice under risk, Quiggin and Chambers [44, 45] analyze models featuring an exoge-
nously given, objective reference probability p. Under suitable assumptions, a random variable y is
evaluated according to the difference between its expectation Ep(y) with respect to p, and a “risk index”
(y)—a representation that is clearly reminiscent of the VEU representation.17
Similar functional forms also appear in the social-choice literature. A classic result due to Roberts
[46] characterizes social-welfare functionals that evaluate a proﬁle u1,...,uI of utility imputations ac-




i ui. Ben-Porath and Gilboa [3] characterize
orderings over income distributions that can be represented in what is essentially a special case of the
VEU functional, with the uniform distribution as reference probability. Incidentally, the adjustment part
of the representation in [3] has an interesting interpretation in terms of adjustment tuples (cf. Def. 1).
While these contributions are not directly relevant to choice under uncertainty, it is worth empha-
sizing that representations similar to the one proposed here have proved effective in a variety of settings.
The literature on model uncertainty, initiated by Lars Hansen, Thomas Sargent and coauthors (see
e.g. [29, 30]), also prominently features a reference prior; the focus in this literature is largely on applica-
tions to macroeconomics and ﬁnance, rather than on behavioral foundations. An interesting axiomati-
zation has recently been provided by Strzalecki [55]; see also Wang [57].
A recent paper by Grant and Polak [28] provides a “primal representation” of Maccheroni et al.’s vari-
ational preferences model [37] in a ﬁnite-states setting, and generalizes it by relaxing translation invari-
ance (monotonicity and ambiguity aversion are also weakened). The representation Grant and Polak
propose is related to the ones in Quiggin and Chambers [45] and Roberts [46]: each act f is evaluated by
aggregating a “reference expected utility” term Ep[u  f ], where p denotes a suitable reference prior, and
an “ambiguity index” () that depends upon the utility differences u(f (!i)) Ep[u  f ] in each state !i.
Grant and Polak show that variational preferences aggregate these two components additively, whereas
relaxing translation invariance leads to more general aggregators.
In comparison with the VEU representation proposed here, the reference prior in [28] is deﬁned by a
geometric, rather than behavioral condition, and is not unique in general. More precisely, in the space of
utility proﬁles, the prior p in [28] corresponds to a hyperplane supporting the individual’s indifference
curves at a point on the certainty line. Decision models featuring a kink at certainty (e.g. MEU, CEU
or invariant biseparable preferences) allow for multiple supporting hyperplanes, and hence multiple
reference priors as deﬁned in [28]. One way to ensure uniqueness is to assume that indifference curves
17See also Epstein [16] and Safra and Segal [47].
23are “ﬂat” or smooth at certainty; but, in this case, the prior p only reﬂects (indeed, under smoothness,
approximates) local behavior around the certainty line. The baseline prior in the VEU representation is
instead uniquely identiﬁed by the individual’s preferences over complementary acts. Hence, every act
contributes to the behavioral identiﬁcation of the baseline prior in the VEU representation; conversely,
the baseline prior provides a behaviorally signiﬁcant contribution to the VEU evaluation of every act.
Furthermore, Grant and Polak maintain a form of ambiguity aversion, which is required for the exis-
tence of a supporting hyperplane at certainty; the VEU representation instead allows for arbitrary ambi-
guityattitudes. Finally,theambiguityindex in[28]isnotinvarianttosignchanges;theVEUadjustment
functional A instead satisﬁes this invariance property, which supports the intuition that adjustments to
baseline evaluations reﬂect outcome variability, or dispersion.
On the other hand, the analysis of VEU preferences provided in this paper does assume translation
invariance (cf. Axiom 3.5); however, see §5.2 below.
Decision models that incorporate a reference prior have also been analyzed in environments where
the objects of choice either consists of, or include sets of probabilities. In Stinchcombe [53], Gajdos, Tal-
lonandVergnaud[19]andGajdos,Hayashi,TallonandVergnaud[20],thereferencepriorischaracterized
as the Steiner point of the set of probabilities under consideration. In Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud [18]
and Wang [57], each object of choice explicitly indicates the reference prior. The present paper comple-
ments the analysis in these contributions by offering a characterization of a decision model featuring a
baseline prior in a fully subjective environment.
Kopylov[36]axiomatizesaspecialcaseofmaxmin-expectedutilitypreferences, wherethecharacter-
izing set of priors is generated by -contamination: that is, it takes the form f(1 )p +q :q 2g, where
p serves as a reference prior and  is a set of “contaminating” probability measures. While the prior p is
endogenously derived, the set  must be speciﬁed exogenously.
Finally, recall that, for any capacity (non-additive set function) v, the Moebius inverse  of v, is a set
function with the property that v(E) can be obtained as the sum of (F), for all F  E. The quantity (F)
is interpreted as the “weight of evidence” supporting F, independently of its subsets; see Shafer [50] for
details. In a somewhat “dual” fashion, the adjustment measures (mi)0i<n in the VEU model represents
theinteractionpatternsamongambiguousevents;looselyspeaking,itindicateshowevidenceaboutone
event can be combined with evidence about another.18
5.2 Additional Features and Extensions
Probabilistic Sophistication. It is possible to construct examples of non-EU VEU preferences that are
probabilistically sophisticated in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler [38]. A precise characterization
18I thank Peter Wakker for pointing out this connection.
24of probabilistic sophistication for VEU preferences is left for future work; however, Sec. B.10 in the Ap-
pendix provides a simple, related result that sheds further light on the central role of baseline probabili-
ties in the VEU model.
Speciﬁcally, given a preference relation ¼ on L0, deﬁne the induced likelihood ordering ¼` by
8E,F 2, E ¼` F , xEy ¼xFq for all x,y 2X with x y.
Proposition B.15 in Sec. B.10 shows that, if ¼ is a VEU preference, then the induced likelihood ordering
is represented by a (convex-ranged) probability measure  if and only if  is the baseline prior for ¼.
Translation-invariance. Because they satisfy the Weak Certainty Independence axiom 3.5, VEU pref-
erences are invariant to “translation in utility space”; in the language of Grant and Polak [28], they dis-
play “constant absolute ambiguity aversion,” as do, for instance, MEU, CEU, variational and invariant-
biseparable preferences.
It should be emphasized that this is solely a consequence of Axiom 3.5: in particular, the key novel
axiominthecharacterizationoftheVEUrepresentation, namelyComplementaryIndependence(Axiom
3.7, is consistent with departures from translation invariance. Consider an “aggregator” function W :
R2 ! R, strictly increasing in both arguments.19 Also let u,p,m and A be as in the VEU representation.
Then one may consider preferences deﬁned by
8f ,g 2 L0 f ¼ g , W
Z
u  f dp,A
Z




u  g dp,A
Z
u  g dm

;
thus, the representation considered in this paper corresponds to the aggregator W(x,y) = x +y. It is
then clear thatAxiom 3.7 holds for suchpreferences: to elaborate, if the acts f and ¯ f are complementary,
A(
R
u  f dm) = A(
R
u  ¯ f dm), and therefore the ranking of f and ¯ f is still determined by their baseline
expected utilities because W is strictly increasing; this immediately implies the claim.
Therefore, it may be possible to relax Axiom 3.5 to characterize a version of the VEU representation
thatdoesnotnecessarilysatisfy“constantabsoluteambiguityaversion.” Noticethattheproposedgener-
alized VEU representation would still feature sign- and translation-invariant adjustments A(
R
u  f dm),
and hence would be fully consistent with the variability interpretation described in this paper.20 Such an
extension is left to future work.
Finite adjustment tuples. In applications, it is convenient to consider representations featuring a
ﬁnite number of adjustment tuples. Theorem 3.1 shows that this is without loss of generality, if the state
space is ﬁnite. For general state spaces, the approach in Siniscalchi [52] provides one way to guarantee
by means of behavioral axioms that ﬁnitely many adjustment measures are sufﬁcient.
19That is, such that x x0 and y >y 0, or x >x0 and y y 0, both imply W(x,y)>W(x0,y 0).
20Axiom 3.8 may impose restrictions on the aggregator W. However, recall from Sec. 3 that this axiom may be dropped by
ensuring that utility is unbounded, as in Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [37] or Grant and Polak [28].
25A Appendix: Miscellanea
A.1 Adjustment tuples and vector measures
Consider an adjustment tuple m 2Mn(), 0<n 1, and let ^ m :!Rn be deﬁned as in Sec. 2.1. By assumption,
for every E 2 , there is N(E) < 1 such that supi jmi(E)j  N(E); hence, one can view ^ m as a map from  to `n
1,
the set of supnorm-bounded real sequences of n terms (which of course coincides with Rn if n <1). Moreover, by
the Nicodym boundedness theorem (cf. Dunford and Schwartz [10], §IV.9.8), this implies that supfjmi(E)j:0i <
n,E 2 g < 1; in turn, this implies that ^ m is a vector measure with bounded semi-variation (cf. [10], §IV.10.3-4):





















Integration with vector measures of bounded semivariation can be deﬁned as in the development of the Lebesgue
theory. For every simple function a =
PK
k=1k1Ek 2 B0(), deﬁne
Z




Next, for any a 2 B(), consider a sequence (ak)k1  B0() such that ak !a in the sup norm; then let
Z
a d ^ m = lim
k!1
Z
ak d ^ m,
wherethelimitistakenw.r.tothe`1 norm. Itissimpletoverifythatthesedeﬁnitionsarewell-posed(fora 2 B0(),
theintegralisthesameforanyrepresentationofa asalinearcombinationofindicatorfunctions; andfora 2 B(),
the integral is the same for all approximating sequences of simple functions).
The equality
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where sgn(x) equals  1,0,1 iff x is negative, zero, or positive respectively, and the last expression is the total vari-
ation v(mi,
) of the scalar, signed measure mi on the set 
. Hence, v(mi,
)  k ^ mk(
) < 1 for all 0  i < n.







). But this implies that, if ak ! a in the supremum norm












a dmi, uniformly in i,
which implies that
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A.2 Conditions for Monotonicity
Remark A.1 Ifatuple(u,p,n,m,A)satisﬁesConditions1and2inDef. 2,n <1,andA iscontinuousonR0(m,u(X))





for all ' 62A 1(0).
26Proof: It is easy to see that Condition 3 is equivalent to the following requirement: for all a 2 B0(,u(X)), E 2 






For any ' 2 R0(m,u(X)), if A(') = 0 or ' =
R
a dm and a + 1E 2 B0(,u(X)) for some  > 0, Eq. (16) readily
implies the condition in the Remark; if A(') 6= 0, ' =
R
a dm, but a + 1E 62 B0(,u(X)) for any  > 0, then let
F = f! : a(!) = max u(X)g; since a takes up ﬁnitely many distinct values, it must be the case that F 6= ;. In this
case, consider the sequence (ak) given by ak = a  1F
1
k ; for k sufﬁciently large, ak 2 B0(,u(X)), A(
R
ak dm) 6= 0,






ak dm)mi(E)  0 for all large k,
and the claim follows by continuity of the partial derivatives
@ A
@ 'i .
Now suppose the condition in the Remark holds, and ﬁx a,E, > 0 such that a,a + 1E 2 B0(,u(X)); to
simplify the notation, write ' =
R
a dm+m(E) for all 2[0,].














as required. If 0 >0, then by continuity A('0)=0=A('0), so
0p(E)+A('0) A('0)=0p(E)0. (18)
Thus, in particular, if 0 = , Eq. (16) holds. If instead 0 < 1, then one can repeat the preceding argument with
a0 =
R
a dm+01E and 0 = 0 in lieu of a and ; by assumption A(
R
a0dm+m(E))6=0 for all 2(0,0), so the
argument just given implies that ( 0)p(E)+A(') A('0)0; together with Eq. (18), this implies that Eq. (16)
holds in this case as well.
Consider now the case A('0) > 0. Let 1 = supf 2 [0,] : A(') 6= 0g. By continuity of A, 1 > 0; thus, integrat-
ing on (0,1) as in Eq. (17) yields 1p(E)+A('1) A('0)0. If 1 = the proof is complete. Otherwise, note that,
by continuity of A, A('1) = 0. Letting a0 = a +11E and 0 =  1 in lieu of a and , and applying the argument
given above yields ( 1)p(E)+A(') A('0)0; together with 1p(E)+A('1) A('0)0, this implies that Eq.
(16) holds.
Remark A.2 If a tuple (u,p,n,m,A) satisﬁes Conditions 1 and 2 in Def. 2 and A is concave and positively homo-
geneous, then (u,p,n,m,A) satisﬁes Condition 3 if and only if p(E)+A(m(E))0 for all E 2.





a dm)forall>0anda 2 B0(,u(X)). Hence, A(
R
a dm)iswell-deﬁnedforalla 2 B0(), andA









2A('  ), so A('  )A(') A( ).
Now suppose that p(E)+A(m(E))  0 for all E 2 , and consider a,b 2 B0(,R) with a(!)  b(!) for all !.







(a  b)dm)  0. But the argument given above implies
that A(
R












b dm). The other direction is
immediate.
A.3 Examples
Proof of Remark 4.2: Fix a non-constant a 2 Rn+1; since both the functional I and the MEU functional are
constant-linear, it is enough to consider vectors a such that
P
i ai = 0. Now consider the problem minq2C
R
a dq;
























with 0, 2R andqi 0 for all i. Differentiating with respect toqi and equating to 0 yields ai +2(qi  pi) =
0 (the assumption that pi >  implies that qi > 0 at the optimum, so the ﬁrst-order condition must hold with
equality). Assuming further that > 0, summing over all i, and invoking the constraint
P
i qi = 1 yields  = 0, and
so qi = pi  
1








































B.1 Additional Notation and Preliminaries on Niveloids
Throughout this Appendix, if 
 is endowed with a topology, the set of continuous real functions on 
 will be de-
noted by C(
). Furthermore, ba() and ba1() indicate, respectively, the set of ﬁnitely additive measures and the
set of charges (ﬁnitely additive probabilities) on (
,); recall that ba() is isometrically isomorphic to the norm
dual of B0() and B(), and similarly, if 
 is a compact metric space, ca() is isometrically isomorphic to the norm
dual ofC(
). Recall that the (ba(,B()) and (ba(),B0()) topologies coincide on ba1(), the set of probability
charge; they are referred to as the weak topology.
Furthermore,if Risanon-empty,non-singletoninterval,denoteby B0(, ), B(, )andC(, )therestric-
tions of B0(), B() and C() to functions taking values in  . Then the weak topology on ba1() also coincides
with the (ba(),B0(, )) and (ba(),B(, )) topologies.
The indicator function of an event E 2  will be denoted by 1E. Inequalities between two elements a,b of
B0(), B() or C(
) are interpreted pointwise: a b means that a(!)b(!) for all !2
.




 for all 
 2 R such that 
1
 2 ; monotonic iff, for all a,b 2 , a  b implies I(a)  I(b);
constant-mixture invariant iff, for all a 2 ,  2 (0,1), and 
 2 R with 
1
 2 , I(a +(1 )
) = I(a)+(1 )
;
28vertically invariant iff I(a +
) = I(a)+
 for all a 2  and 
 2 R such that a +
 2 ; and afﬁne iff, for all a,b 2 
and 2(0,1), I(a +(1 )b)=I(a)+(1 )I(b). Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini [37] (MMR henceforth)
demonstrated the usefulness of niveloids in decision theory, and established certain useful results reviewed below.
If  = B0() or  = B(), then a functional I :  ! R is positively homogeneous iff, for all a 2  and   0,
I(a) = I(a); c-additive iff I(a + ) = I(a) +  for all  2 R+ and a 2 ; additive iff I(a +b) = I(a) + I(b) for
all a,b 2 ; c-linear iff it is c-additive and positively homogeneous; and linear iff it is additive and positively
homogeneous.
The following useful results on niveloids are due to or reviewed in MMR. In particular, item 6 provides a ﬁrst
representation for preferences satisfying the basic axioms considered here, except for the symmetry requirements.
Proposition B.1 (MMR) Let   be an interval such that 02int( ) and I : B0(,K)!R.
1. If I is a niveloid, it is is supnorm, hence Lipschitz continuous.
2. If I : B0(,K)!R is a niveloid, then it has a (minimal) niveloidal extension to B().
3. I is a niveloid iff it is monotonic and constant-mixture invariant.
4. If I is constant-mixture invariant, then it is vertically invariant.





6. A preference ¼ on L0 satisﬁes Axioms 3.1–3.4 if and only if there is a non-constant, afﬁne function u :X !R
and a normalized niveloid I : B0(,u(X))!R such that f ¼ g iff I(u  f ) I(u  g).
The following uniqueness result is straightforward:
Corollary B.2 If I,u and I 0,u 0 provide two representations of ¼ as per the last point of Prop. B.1, then u 0 =u +
(with >0) and I 0(a)=I(a) for all a 2 B(,u(X)).
Proof: SinceI andI 0 arenormalized,standardresultsimplythatu 0 =u+ forsome>0and 2R. Next,forev-
erya 2 B(, ), let f 2 L0 besuchthatu f =a andx  f : thus, since I and I 0 arenormalized, u(x)= I(u f )= I(a)
andsimilarlyu 0(x)= I 0(u 0f ),i.e. u(x)+ = I 0(uf +),sou(x)= I 0(uf )byverticalinvariance[therequire-
mentthatu f + 2 B0(,u 0(X))istriviallysatisﬁed, asu f + =u 0f 2 B0(,u 0(X))]. ButthenI(a)= I 0(a),
as required. [Note that this is consistent with normalization: I(
1
)=




B.2 A generalized -MEU representation
This subsection extends the characterization results of Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [22] (GMM hence-
forth) to allow for the weakened c-Independence axiom adopted here (Axiom 3). This entails replicating and often
29modifying their arguments and conclusions, so as not to rely upon positive homogeneity of I. The main objective










where C  ba1() is weak closed and convex, and 
 : B0(, ) ! [0,1] is such that 
(a) = 
(b) whenever there




b dq +  for all q 2 C. As the construction carried out below demonstrates, the
set C can be viewed as providing a representation of “unambiguous preferences,” as is the case in the original
setting adopted by GMM. Also, whileC can no longer be identiﬁed with the Clarke differential of I at 0, its support
functional has a similar interpretation as the Clarke (lower) derivative of I in GMM. This turns out to be sufﬁcient
for the purposes of constructing the VEU representation.
The ﬁrst step in this construction is to deﬁne and characterize an “unambiguous” ordering on utility proﬁles.
Note that GMM ﬁrst deﬁne an “unambiguous preference relation” ¼ on acts, and then translate that into an or-
dering over their utility proﬁles; since this paper does not focus on the interpretation of ¼, a more direct route is
taken; the techniques, however, are similar.
Lemma B.3 Let  R be a non-singleton interval and I : B0(, )!R be a niveloid. Deﬁne a binary relation  on
B0(, ) by
8a,b 2 B0(, ), a b , 82(0,1],c 2 B0(, ): I(a +(1 )c) I(b +(1 )c).




b dq for allq 2C.
Note: write “a 'b” for “a b and b a.”
Proof: It will be shown that  is a monotonic, conic, continuous and non-trivial preorder; the result then follows
from Proposition A.2 in GMM. The arguments closely mimic Prop. 4 in GMM.
 is monotonic: if a(!)  b(!) for all !, then also a(!)+(1 )c(!)  b(!)+(1 )c(!) for all  2 (0,1].
Since I is monotonic, I(a +(1 )c) I(b +(1 )c), i.e. a b.
 is reﬂexive: follows from monotonicity.
 is transitive: if a  b and b  c, then for all  2 (0,1] and all d, I(a + (1   )d)  I(b + (1   )d) 
I(c +(1 )d), so a c.






























for all  2(0,1], so a +(1 )c b +(1 )c. The case =1 is trivial.
 is continuous: if an ! a and bn !b in B0(, ), then for every  and c, I(an +(1 )c) ! I(a +(1 )c)
and similarly for b because I is supnorm-continuous, and the claim follows.
30Finally,  is nontrivial: consider 
,
0 2   such that 
 > 
0; by monotonicity, 
  





0+(1 )c) for all c 2 B0(, ) and 2(0,1]: for =1, one obtains I(
) I(









0): contradiction. Thus, 

0 but not 
0 
, as required.
Recall that a niveloid I : B0(, ) ! R has a minimal extension to a niveloid ^ I : B() ! R. The next Lemma
shows that (1) the extension is unique on B(, ), and (2) if  is extended to B(, ), then it is represented by the
set C as in Lemma B.3.
Lemma B.4 Assume that 0 2 int( ). Then a niveloid I : B0(, ) ! R has a unique niveloidal extension to B(, ),
denoted by ^ I. Furthermore, deﬁne the relation ^  on B(
,) by
8a,b 2 B(, ), a ^ b , 82(0,1],c 2 B(, ): ^ I(a +(1 )c) ^ I(b +(1 )c).




b dq for allq 2C, where C is as in that Lemma.
Proof: Let ˜ I be the (minimal) niveloidal extension of I to B(); its restriction to B(, ), denoted ^ I, is an extension
of I to B(, )(i.e. itisaniveloidonthelatterset). Furthermore, supposethereisanotherextension I 0 : B(, )!R
of I, and take a 2 B(, ). There is a sequence (ak)  B0(, ) such that ak ! a; since both ^ I and I 0 are supnorm
continuous, ^ I(a)=limk ^ I(ak)=limk I 0(ak)= I 0(a); thus, the niveloidal extension of I to B(, ) is unique.
Turn to the relation ^ . Note ﬁrst that, if ^ I(a +(1 )c)  ^ I(b +(1 )c) for all c 2 B0(, ), then this is true
also for all c 2 B(, ), because ^ I is continuous. This implies that ^  extends .
Suppose that a,b 2 B(, ) and a ^ b, so ^ I(a +(1 )c)  ^ I(b +(1 )c) for all  2 (0,1] and c 2 B0(, ).



















2b. Also, since 0 2 int( ), sup
1
2a(
) < sup   and inf
1
2b(
) > inf  , so there are
sequences (ak),(bk) B0(, ) such that ak #
1
2a and bk "
1
2b;21 for such sequences, by monotonicity of ^ I, one has
I(ak +(1 )c)= ^ I(ak +(1 )c) ^ I(
1
2a +(1 )c) ^ I(
1
2b +(1 )c) ^ I(bk +(1 )c)= I(bk +(1 )c)




























bk dq for all q 2 C, so ^ I(ak +(1 )c) = I(ak +(1 )c)  I(bk +(1 )c) = ^ I(bk +(1 )c) for
all  and c 2 B0(, ), and by continuity ^ I((a)+(1 )c) ^ I((b)+(1 )c). Letting !1 and again invoking
continuity shows that a b.
The following result identiﬁes a useful vertical-invariance property relating ^ I and the set C.




b dq+ for allq 2C, then
^ I(a)= ^ I(b)+.
21Suppose inf c(
) > inf   and supc(
) < sup  . For each k = 0,1,... and ` = 0,...,2k, let 










`,kg. Then ak #c and bk "c.
31Proof: Assume ﬁrst that inf b(
),sup b(
) 2 int( ). Then there exists  2 (0,1) such that b + 2 B(, ). For all








Claim: for all k, ak +(1 )k 2 B(, ) and ak+1^ 'ak +(1 )k.


































because ^ ' is a conic preorder.22
The claim implies that, for all k 1, ^ I(ak)= ^ I(ak 1+(1 )k 1)= ^ I(ak 1)+(1 )k 1, where the second











Since ak !a and ^ I is continuous, the result follows.
If b is arbitrary, for k  0, let ak =
k
k+1a and bk =
k
k+1b, so in particular bk(
)  int( ); furthermore, for every
















k+1, and it has just been shown that then
^ I(ak)= ^ I(bk)+
k
k+1. Since ak !a and bk !b, continuity implies that ^ I(a)= ^ I(b)+.
With I, ^ I and C as in Lemmata B.3 and B.4, deﬁne, for every a 2 B(, ):
C(a) =
¨Z
a dq : q 2C
«

























^ I(a +(1 )b)  ^ I((1 )b)

.
Clearly (take  = 1) I0(a)  I(a)  I 0(a); also, if I is positive homogeneous, then I0(a) = infb2B0(, ) ^ I(a +b) I(a)
etc., which, as shown in GMM, is the (lower) Clarke derivative of ^ I at 0. Finally, notice that I0 and ^ I0 differ in that
the “perturbation” b is chosen from B0(, ) and B(, ) respectively.
The following Lemma provides the sought-after GMM-type representation of ^ I.
22The proof is identical to that given in Lemma B.3; alternatively, it follows from the representation provided in Lemma B.4.
32Lemma B.6 Let I, ^ I and C be as in Lemmata B.3 and B.4. For all a 2 B(, ), Cmin(a)= I0(a)= ^ I0(a) and Cmax(a)=
I 0(a)= ^ I 0(a). Furthermore, there is a function 
: B(, )!R such that








b dq+ andCmin(a)<Cmax(a), then 
(a)=
(b).
Proof: Observe ﬁrst that, for every >0, if
1
[^ I(a +(1 )b)  ^ I((1 )b)2[^ I0(a), ^ I0(a)+) for some b 2 B(,
),
then there is b0 2 B0(,
) such that
1
[^ I(a +(1 )b0)  ^ I((1 )b0) 2 [^ I0(a), ^ I0(a)+) as well; thus, I0 = ^ I0, and
similarly I 0 = ^ I 0.
Observe ﬁrst that I0,Cmin,I 0,Cmax are monotonic functionals. Now assume that inf a(
,sup a(
) 2 int( ).
Then, by monotonicity, Cmin(a),Cmax(a) 2  , and mimicking GMM’s Lemma B.4, observe that Cmin(a)  a: hence,
for all  2 (0,1] and all b 2 B0(, ), ^ I(a +(1 )b)  ^ I(Cmin(a)+(1 )b) = Cmin(a)+ ^ I((1 )b), where the
equality follows by vertical invariance, and this implies that Cmin(a) I0(a).
Conversely, by deﬁnition I0(a) 
1
[I(a +(1 )b) I((1 )b)] for all  2 (0,1] and b 2 B0(, ), i.e. I0(a)+
I((1 )b) I(a +(1 )b), i.e. I(I0(a)+(1 )b) I(a +(1 )b) by vertical invariance. By monotonicity of
I0, I0(a)2 , so I0(a)a, which implies that I0(a)
R
a dq for all q 2C, and hence that I0(a)Cmin(a).
Now note that Cmin is positively homogeneous; furthermore, I0(a)  I0(a) for all  2 (0,1) and a 2 B(, ).
To see this, suppose that, for some  2 (0,1),  > 0,  2 (0,1] and b 2 B0(, ) are such that
1
[^ I((a) + (1  
)b) I((1 )b)]  I0(a)+; but b0 =
1 
1 b 2 B(, ), and so I0(a) 
1
[^ I(a +(1 )b0) I((1 )b0)] =
1
[^ I((a)+(1 )b)  I((1 )b)] 
1
[I0(a)+]. Thus, I0(a)  I0(a), as claimed. Finally, for an arbitrary
a 2 B(, ), let ak =
k
k+1a for k  0; then inf ak(
),sup ak(
) 2  , so I0(ak) = Cmin(ak) for all k; by the claim




k Cmin(ak) = Cmin(a). Suppose the inequality is strict; then there is
b 2 B0(, ) and 2(0,1] such that
1
























[^ I(ak +(1 )b) I((1 )b]<Cmin(ak), a contradiction. Thus, I0(a)=Cmin(a) for all
a 2 B(, ). The argument for I 0 and Cmax is analogous.
Turn now to the representation of ^ I. Let 
(a) =
^ I(a) Cmax(a)
Cmin(a) Cmax(a) if Cmin(a) < Cmax(a), and deﬁne 
(a) arbitrary
otherwise. Then it is clear that Eq. (20) obtains. Furthermore, if a,b, are as in the statement, then Cmin(a) =














Finally, a characterization of crisp acts (cf. §2.2) is provided.
33Lemma B.7 Consider a preference ¼ that has a niveloidal representation (I,u), with 0 2 int(u(x)). For any act
f 2 L0, the following are equivalent:
(1) f is crisp;
(2) u  f ' I(u  f );
(3) minq2C
R
u  f dq=maxq2C
R
u  f dq, whereC is as in Lemma B.3.
Proof: (1) ) (2): by assumption, f  x implies f +(1 )g  x +(1 )g for all g 2 L0 and  2 [0,1]; that is,
I(u f +(1 )u g)= I(u(x)+(1 )u g)forall2[0,1]. Since f x implies I(u f )=u(x), theclaimfollows.
(2) ) (1): by Lemma B.3, u  f ' I(u  f ) implies that
R
u  f dq= I(u  f ) for all q 2C, and the claim follows.
(3) ) (1): by Lemma B.6, Cmin(u  f )  I(u  f )  Cmax(u  f ); by assumption, Cmin(u  f ) = Cmax(u  f ), so
I(u f )=
R
u f dq forallq 2C. Thus, ifx  f , thenu(x)=
R
u f dq forallq 2C. Butthisimpliesthatu f 'u(x),
i.e. for all g 2 L0 and  2 [0,1], I(u  f +(1 )u  g) = I(u(x)+(1 )u  g), i.e. f +(1 )g  x +(1 )g.
Hence, f is crisp.
B.3 Functional Characterizations of Complementary Independence
ThissubsectionprovidesthekeystepsinthecharacterizationofVEUpreferences. Thestartingpointisthe“niveloidal
representation” of ¼ provided by Part 6, which was shown to also have a GMM-type formulation in §B.2. It will ﬁrst
be shown that Axioms 3.8 and 3.7 hold if and only if a “baseline linear functional” J can be deﬁned. Then, the lin-
earity of the functional J is related to the GMM-type representation of I: speciﬁcally, it is shown to correspond to
(1)symmetryofthesetC ofprobabilitiesinEq. (19)aroundtheprobabilityp thatrepresents J, and(2)asymmetry
property of the weight function 
().
Lemma B.8 Let ¼ be represented by I,u as in Prop. B.1, and assume wlog that 0 2 int(u(X)). Deﬁne a functional
J : B0(,u(X))!Rbyletting, foralla 2 B0(,u(X))and
2Rwith









Then J is a well-deﬁned, normalized niveloid; furthermore, ¼ satisﬁes Axioms 3.8 and 3.7 if and only if J is afﬁne;
in this case, J has a unique, normalized and positive linear extension to B().










 a) for all a,
 a 2 B(,u(X)).







a]2 B0(,u(X)); furthermore, if 
,
0 2R are such that 
 a,




















































, because I is normalized and 01
 2 B0(,u(X)). Finally, J is a niveloid: for a,b 2 B0(,u(X)), if
, 2u(X) are such that  a,  b 2 B0(,u(X)), then











34Turn now to Axioms 3.8 and 3.7.




2 J(a) for all a 2 B0(,u(X)). Fix f , ¯ f ,x, ¯ x
as in Axiom 3.8 and let a 2 B0(,u(X)) and 
 2 R be such that a = u  f and 
























 a)2 B0(,u(X))] and the properties of






























2 J(a). Thus, if J has
this property, then Axiom 3.8 holds. Conversely, for any a 2 B0(,u(X)), there is f 2 L0 such that u  f = a, and
as noted in the ﬁrst part of this proof, one can ﬁnd 
 2 R with 
 a 2 B0(,u(X)); again, there will be ¯ f 2 L0 with
u  ¯ f =

















2 J(a), and, as shown above, in this case Axiom 3.8 holds. Next, consider (f , ¯ f ), (g, ¯ g) and  as in Axiom 3.7. Let








2u( ¯ g(!)) = z0 for all !;
ﬁnally, let ¯ a =2z  a and ¯ b =2z 0 b, so ¯ a =u  ¯ f and ¯ b =u  ¯ g. Then f ¼ ¯ f and g ¼ ¯ g imply I(a) I( ¯ a)= I(2z  a),




2(2z  a) = z; similarly, J(b)  z 0. If J is afﬁne, then J(a +(1 )b) = J(a)+(1 )J(b) 
[z +(1 )z 0], so
I(a +(1 )b) I( ¯ a +(1 )¯ b)= I(a +(1 )b) I([2z  a]+(1 )[2z
0  b])=
= I(a +(1 )b) I(2[z +(1 )z
0] a  (1 )b)=2J(a +(1 )b) 2[z +(1 )z
0]0.
where the last equality follows from the deﬁnition of J. Thus, f +(1 )g ¼ ¯ f +(1 ) ¯ g, i.e. Axiom 3.7 holds.




2 J(a) for all








2 J(b) for all a,b 2 B0(,u(X)).
Since 0 2 int(u(X)), there is  > 0 such that [ ,]  u(X). Assume ﬁrst that kak,kbk 
1
2; this implies
that (a) a,b, a, b 2 B0(,u(X)), and furthermore (b) a   J(a),b   J(b), J(a) a, J(b) b 2 B0(,u(X)), because




2]. Let f ,g, ¯ f , ¯ g 2 L0 besuchthata J(a)=uf ,b J(b)=ug,












































Now, for arbitrary a,b 2 B0(,u(X)), there is an integer K > 0 such that 2 Kkak,2 Kkbk 
1
2. Then the








2 J(2 Kb); but it was shown above that, for all








































This implies that J(a +(1 )b)=J(a)+(1 )J(b) for all dyadic rationals =k2 K, with k 2f0,...,Kg for
some integer K > 0.23 But since these are dense in [0,1] and J is supnorm-continuous, J is afﬁne. The extension
23The claim is easily established by induction on K.
35of J to B() is now standard.
Finally, to prove the Corollary, if a,













 a). It follows that 



















 ak), so the claim follows by continuity of ^ I.
Next, the implications of the linearity of J for the GMM representation of I are investigated. The following
notation is convenient: let C = fQ 2 B() : 9q 2 C s.t. 8a 2 B(),T(a) =
R
a dqg. Also, say that C is symmetric
around some ^ Q 2 B() iff, for everyQ 2C, 2^ Q  Q 2C (which implies that ^ Q 2C as well).
Lemma B.10 In the setting of Lemma B.8, the functional J is afﬁne on B0(,u(X)) if and only if C is symmetric
around J and 
(a) = 
(   a) for all a 2 B0(,u(X)) such that Cmin(a) < Cmax(a) and  2 R such that    a 2
B0(,u(X)).
Corollary B.11 (Extension to B(,u(X))) The functional 
() also satisﬁes 
(a) = 
(   a) whenever a,   a 2
B(,u(X)), 2R, and Cmin(a)<Cmax(a).
Corollary B.12 (Symmetry ofC) If J is linear, let p 2 ba1() be such that J(a) =
R
a dp for all a 2 B(). Then C is
symmetric around p: ifq 2C, then 2p  q 2C.
Proof: Let Qmin
b 2 argminQ2C Q(b) and Qmax
b 2 argmaxQ2C Q(b) for any b 2 B0(). Two preliminary observations
will be useful.
Claim 1: regardless of whether or not C is symmetric,Qmin
b (b)=Qmax
 b(b) for all  2R.
Claim 2: if C is symmetric around some ^ Q 2 C, then Qmin
b (b)+Qmax
b (b) = 2^ Q(b). To prove this claim, note
that, by deﬁnition,Qmin
b (b) Q(b) for allQ 2 C. Now ﬁx one suchQ. Then, in particular,Qmin
b (b)  2^ Q(b) Q(b),
because 2^ Q  Q 2 C. Hence 2^ Q(b) Qmin
b (b) Q(b): that is, for allQ 2 C, 2^ Q(b) Qmin




























































































a (a); since furthermore C is sym-
metric around some ^ Q 2 C, Claim 2 implies that the expressions in square brackets equal ^ Q(a), and necessity
follows.












k+1 ¯ a +
k
k+1 min`=0,...,kf`,k :a(!)`,kg.
36Now turn to sufﬁciency. For every a 2 B0(,u(X)), let (a) = min a(
)+max a(















Three algebraic facts are key to the proof of Claim 3. First, for all 2(0,1), (a)=(a); second, although in
general (a +(1 )b)6=(a)+(1 )(b), it is nevertheless the case that [(a)+(1 )(b)] [a +(1 )b]=
((a) a)+(1 )((b) b)2 B0(,u(X)). Third, ((a) a)=(a). Combining these facts, one obtains
[(a)+(1 )(b)] [(a) a] (1 )b 2 B0(,u(X)).



























































































ThesecondequalityfollowsbyusingEqs. (21)and(22)tosubstitutefor I([(a) a]+(1 )b)and I((1 )b). The
third equality follows by canceling the terms (1 )(b), using the fact that J is linear, then canceling one of the
terms (a) and ﬁnally simplifying and rewriting the arguments of the two functionals I. Finally, the last equality
follows by noting that b 2 B0(,u(X)) if and only if (b) b 2 B0(,u(X)).
Claim 3 implies that C is symmetric around J. To see this, pick Q 2 C, so Q(a)  I0(a) = Cmin(a) for all
a 2 B0(,u(X)); then, for all a,
2J(a) Q(a)=(a)+I0(a) I0((a) a) Q(a)(a) I0((a) a),
or equivalently I0((a)   a)  2J((a)   a)  Q((a)   a) for all a; since, again, a 2 B0(,u(X)) iff (a)   a 2
B0(,u(X)), this is also equivalent to
8a 2 B0(,u(X)), I0(a)2J(a) Q(a).
37Now recall that I0 =Cmin, and standard separation results25 imply that
C =
¨





then, it follows that 2J  Q 2C. Since C is convex and non-empty, this also implies that it must contain J as well.
Finally, withQmin






















































where the last equality follows from the fact that C is symmetric around J (see Claim 2 at the beginning of this
proof). IfQmin
a (a)<Qmax
a (a), equality can only obtain if 
(a)=
( a), as claimed.
ToprovetheﬁrstCorollary,supposea, a 2 B(, )forsome2Randconsiderasequence(ak) B0(,u(X))


















( a). The second Corollary is straightfor-
ward.
B.4 Monotone Continuity
Assume that   is non-singleton. A functional H : B0(, ) ! R is monotonely continuous iff, for every ,,
 2  
with  >  > 




)1Ak)—or, abusing the notation for binary acts, H(
Ak)> >H(Ak
).
Continue to focus on the representation I,u of ¼; assume wlog that 0 2 int(u(X)). Clearly, ¼ satisﬁes Axiom
3.6 iff I is monotonely continuous. This property will now be characterized in terms of the functional J deﬁned
in Lemma B.8, and the set C deﬁned in Lemma B.3. One implication will be that C consists of countably addi-
tive measures; Lemma B.14 will establish a useful consequence of this fact: it is possible to restrict attention to a
countable subset of measures.
Lemma B.13 The following statements are equivalent:
(1) I is monotonely continuous;
(2) For every decreasing sequence (Ak) such that
T
Ak =;, J(1Ak)!0;
25Call C 0 the set in the r.h.s.; clearly, C C 0, so suppose there is q 2C 0 nC. Since C is weak closed and fqg is weak compact,
byaversionoftheSeparatingHyperplaneTheorem(SeeMegginson, Theorem2.2.28)thereisaweak continuousT :ba()!R
such that Tq < infq02C Tq0; furthermore, Tq0 =
R
a dq
0 for some a 2 B0() (cf. Megginson, Prop. 2.6.4), and it can be assumed
wlog that a 2 B0(,u(X)). But then
R
a dq<Cmin(a), a contradiction.





As noted above, (3) implies in particular that every q 2C is a probability measure.
Proof: (1))(2): let2u(X)besuchthat>0and 2u(X). Forevery2(0,), thereisk0 suchthat> I(1An0)
and k00 such that I((1   1Ak00)) >     (take 
 = 0 and  = ,    in the deﬁnition of monotone continuity).
Letting k = max(k0,k00), so A  Ak0 and A  Ak00, by monotonicity both  > I(1Ak) and I((1   1Ak)) >    
hold; furthermore, since   2 u(X), vertical invariance of I implies that I((1 1Ak)) = + I( 1Ak) >  , i.e.




2I( 1Ak) = J(1Ak). To sum up, if   1, then monotonicity implies that





(2) ) (1): Fix ,,
 2 u(X) with  >  > 





















































where the inequality follows from monotonicity of I, as  ( 
)1Ak0)  . Thus,  > I(
+( 
)1Ak0). Similarly,











































. Thus, I(  (  





Turning now to the ﬁnal statement, note that J 2 C by Lemma B.10, so (3) clearly implies (2). In the oppo-
site direction, ﬁx a sequence as in (2) and (3), let p 2 C represent J, and choose  > 0; then there is k such that
J(1Ak)=p(Ak)<
1
2. If now q(Ak) for some q 2C, thenq0 =2p  q satisﬁes q0(Ak)< =0, and Lemma B.10
implies that q0 2C: but this contradicts the fact that C consists of probability charges. Therefore, q(Ak) <  for all
q 2C, as claimed.
Lemma B.14 Suppose that 
 is a compact metric space and  is its Borel sigma-algebra. Let C  ca1() be
(ca(),B())-compact and symmetric around some p 2C. Then:
(i) for every >0 there is  >0 such that, for every E 2, p(E)< implies q(E)< for allq 2C.






39Proof: Since (ca(),B())  (ca(),C(
)), C is also (ca(),C(
))-compact. Since the (ca(),C(
)) topology
is metrizable, there is a countable (ca(),C(
))-dense subset D of C.
Notice that, for every E 2  and q 2 C, q(E)  2p(E). To see this, suppose that q(E) > 2p(E) for some E and
q. Since C is symmetric around p, q0 = 2p  q 2 C; but then q0(E) = 2p(E)  q(E) < 0, which contradicts the
assumption that C ca1(). Part (i) then follows immediately.
Now consider a 2 B(), q 2 C nD, and  > 0. If kak = 0, so a = 0, there is nothing to prove; thus, assume
kak>0. By (i), there is  >0 such that q00(E)<

6kak for all q00 2C and E 2 such that p(E)<. By Lusin’s Theorem
on measurable functions (Kechris [32, Thm. 17.12]), there exists b 2 C(
) such that p(f! : b(!) 6= a(!)g) < ;










































Finally, by assumption, there is a sequence fqngD such that qn !q in the (ca(),C(
)) topology. Hence, there




























































Note: the preceding result does not actually require symmetry: the existence of p 2 C as in (i) follows from a
theorem of Bartle, Dunford and Schwartz (cf. [9, Corollary 6, p. 14]).
B.5 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Recall that, for any vector measure m on  and interval    R, R0(m, ) =
¦R
a dm:a 2 B0(, )
©
. It is convenient
to extend this to images of functions in B(, ): let R(m, ) =
¦R
a dm:a 2 B(, )
©
. Clearly, R(m, ) is the closure
of R0(m, ).27 It is clear that (2) implies (3) in Theorem 3.1; thus, focus on the non-trivial implications.
B.5.1 (3) implies (1)
For all a 2 B0(,u(X)), let Jp(a) =
R
a dp and I(a) = Jp(a)+A(
R
a dm); thus, for all f ,g 2 L0, f ¼ g iff I(u  f ) 
I(u  g). It is easy to verify that I is constant-mixture invariant and normalized (because m(
) = 0 and A(0) = 0);
furthermore, by part 3 of Def. 2, it is monotonic, and hence a niveloid by Prop. B.1. This implies that ¼ satisﬁes the


































26If kbk>kak, consider the function b0 such that b0(!)=max( kak,min(kak,b(!))) for every !2
.
27If ' 2R(m, ) then there is a 2 B(, ) and (ak)k0  B0(, ) such that ' =
R
a dm and ak !a, so
R
ak dmi !' uniformly
in i; hence, R(m, )cl R0(m, ). The other inclusion is obvious.
40because again m(
) = 0 and A() = A( ) for all  2 R(m, ); thus, the functional J deﬁned in Lemma B.8 coin-
cides with Jp, and hence it is afﬁne; thus, ¼ satisﬁes Axioms 3.7 and 3.8 as well. It remains to be shown that I is























)1Ak). Thus, I ismonotonely
continuous, so ¼ satisﬁes Axiom 3.6.
B.5.2 (1) implies (2)
Since (
,) is standard Borel, it is sufﬁcient to establish the claim under the additional assumption that 
 is a
compact metric space and  is its Borel sigma-algebra.28
Since ¼ satisﬁes Axioms 3.1–3.5, it admits a non-degenerate niveloidal representation I,u by Proposition B.1;
furthermore, it is wlog to assume that 0 2 int(u(X)). Moreover, since ¼ satisﬁes Axioms 3.7 and 3.8, the functional
J deﬁned in Lemma B.10 is afﬁne on B0(,u(X)); ﬁnally, since ¼ satisﬁes Axiom 3.6, I is monotonely continuous.
In the following, ^ I will denote the unique niveloidal extension of I to B(,u(X)).
Let C be the set of probability charges delivered by Lemma B.3. Let p be the probability charge representing
J, so by Lemma B.10, p 2 C and C is symmetric around p. By Lemma B.13, C  ca(), and furthermore for every
sequence (Ak) decreasing to ;, supq2C q(Ak)!0. Finally, let D C be the set delivered by (ii) of Lemma B.14.




b0dq for allq 2C implies that ^ I(b)= ^ I(b0). I claim








b0dq for all q 2 C, or, equivalently,
that
R
b dq=0 for allq 2D implies that
R
b dq=0 for allq 2C. Considerb 2 B(,u(X)) andq 2C nD; assume that
R
b dq
0 = 0 for all q0 2 D. Suppose there is q 2 C with j
R





b dq0j<, so j
R
b dq0j>0, a contradiction.
Now deﬁne a collection m = (mi)0i<1 of signed measures by letting mi(E) = qi(E) p(E) for every E 2 
and i 2 f0,1,...g, where q0,q1,... is an enumeration of D. Clearly, for each i, mi 2 ca1(), mi(;) = mi(
) = 0,









i.e. mi(Ak)!0 uniformly in i; thus, m is an adjustment tuple as per Def. 1.













b dp. ByLemma B.5, this impliesthat ^ I(a)= ^ I(b)+. Furthermore, supposethat a, b 2
28Since (
,) is standard Borel, there exists a Borel isomorphism  :
! K (cf. Kechris [32], p.90), where K is compact metric
and endowed with the Borel sigma-algebra; if 
 is countable, let K = 
, endowed with the Fort topology (ﬁx a point ! 2 
 and
declare E  
 to be open if either (i) ! 62 E or (ii) ! 2 E and 
 n E is ﬁnite). Let L
0 be the set of simple, Borel-measurable
functions from K to X, and deﬁne a binary relation ¼ on L
0 by letting f   1 ¼ g   1 iff f ¼ g for all f ,g 2 L0. Then
it is clear that ¼ satisﬁes any one of the axioms in Sec. 3 if and only if ¼ does, too. Finally, if ¼ has a VEU representation
(u,p,n,m,A), then ¼ has a VEU representation (u,p ,n,m ,A).









for all q 2C, and therefore ^ I( a)= ^ I(  b)+   . Hence,














































 = ^ I(b)  J(b).
Therefore, it is possible to deﬁne a functional A : R(m,u(X)) ! R by letting A() = ^ I(a)  J(a) for every  2 `1
such that  =
R
a dm for some a 2 B(,u(X)). Also, the map a 7! J(a)+A(
R
a dm) coincides with ^ I, and hence is
monotonic by assumption, as required by Def. 2.
It will now be shown that A is supnorm-continuous at 0 2 R1. Observe ﬁrst that
R
0
dm = 0 2 `1, where
0
(!)=0 for all !; thus, A(0)= ^ I(0)  J(0)=0. Moreover, if  =
R










































and similarly for ^ I( a), we get


















































If n !0 in `1, then infi n
i !0 and supi n
i !0, so A(n)!0=A(0), as required.29
Thus, (u,p,1,m,A) is a VEU representation of ¼. It remains to be shown that there is a sharp VEU represen-
tation. Suppose that f 2 L0 is crisp and f  x. By Lemma B.7,
R
u  f dq = u(x) for all q 2 C; since p 2 C, also
R
u f dp=u(x). Hence,
R
u f dmi =
R
u f dqi  
R
u f dp=0 for all i =0,1,..., as required in (1) of Def. 3. Since
there is at least one representation (u,p,1,m,A) that satisﬁes this property, it is clear that there is one adjustment
that satisﬁes (2) in that deﬁnition, i.e. a sharp VEU representation.
Turn now to the case of 
 ﬁnite. Each signed measure m0,m1,... can be viewed as a point in the ﬁnite-
dimensional space R
. Let n0 be the maximal number of linearly independent coordinate measures; note that,
29For every >0 there is n() such that j
n





42due to the normalization mi(
) = 0, n0  j
j 1. By relabeling, one can assume w.l.o.g. that m0,...,mn0 1 are a
maximal collection of linearly independent measures. Let m0 = (m0,...,nn0 1) and deﬁne A0 : R(m0,u(X)) ! R
by A0(
R
a dm0) = A(
R














b dmi for all i  n0, because
each such mi must be a linear combination of m0,...,mn0 1. Also, clearly, m0 2Mn0(), and it is easy to check that





0) is monotonic; furthermore, if f 2 L0 is crisp, then it was
shown above that
R
u  f dm=0, so a fortiori
R
u  f dm
0 =0. I now claim that A0 is continuous at 0.
For every i  0, let i = (i0,...,in0 1) 2 Rn0 be the unique vector such that mi =
Pn0 1
j=0 ijmj. Clearly, for
every ! 2 
, jmi(!)j  jqi(!)j+jp(!)j  2; hence, fm1,m2,...g is a bounded subset of R
. Moreover, for every j =
0,...,n0  1 the “coordinate functional” Aj associating with each point of the form  =
Pn0 1
j=0 jmj the coefﬁcient
j is bounded (cf. Megginson [39], Thm. 1.4.12). These two facts imply that ¯   maxj=0,...,n0 1supi0jijj < 1.
Thus, consider a sequence f'kg  R(m0,u(X)) such that 'k ! 0, and for each k, let ak 2 B(,u(X)) be such that
R
ak dm


















































Thus, 'k ! 0 implies that
R
ak dmi ! 0 uniformly in i  0. Then limk!1A0('k) = limk!1A(
R
ak dm) = 0, as
required. Therefore, (u,p,n0,m0,A0) is VEU representation that satisﬁes (1) in Def. 3, and such that n0  j
j 1. It
follows that, as claimed, any minimal VEU representation will employ an adjustment tuple of size at most n0.
Observation: the above proof of (1) ) (2) actually constructs a representation of the extension ^ I of I to
B(,u(X)). Therefore, as usual, the VEU representation (u,p,n,m,A) applies to the unique continuous extension
of ¼ to L(¼), the class of ¼-bounded, -measurable acts.
B.5.3 Uniqueness
By standard arguments, u 0 = u + for some , 2 R with  > 0; consequently,   2 R0(m,u(X)) if and only if
  2 R0(m0,u(X)); the constant  can be disregarded, as m(
) = 0 and m0(





a dm); deﬁne I 0 similarly using the second VEU representation. By Cor. B.2, I(a) = I 0(a)
for every a 2 B0(,u(X)); hence, if J and J 0 are the corresponding functionals deﬁned as in Lemma B.8, their



















0)=A0((1 ) 0+0)=A0((1 ) 0). Nowpick 2R0(m,u(X)),sothereisc 2 B0(,u(X))suchthat
R
c dm= ;



































the second and fourth equalities follow from Eq. (23). In particular, A(
R
(a  b)dm) = 0. Now let 
 2 u(x) be such
that 





 b) = u  f . Now
R







u  f dm)=0, and if f x 2X, then u(x)=
R
u  f dp. Therefore, for every g 2 L0 and 2(0,1],
I(u [(1 )g +f ])=(1 )
Z
u  g dp+
Z




u  g dm+
Z



























































u  g dm

= I(u [(1 )g +x]).











 2 B0(,u(X)), and of course
R

dm = 0. Thus, the act f is crisp, and applying (1) in Def. 3 to (u,p,n,m,A),
R
(a  b)dm = 2
R
u  f dm = 0.





a dm for all a 2 B0(,u(X)). That T is afﬁne is immediate, as is
the fact that T is onto. Finally, if '0 =
R
a dm












A0('0), where the second equality follows from the deﬁnition of T, and the third from Eq. (23): thus, A =
1
A0 T.




b dm: then, since also











0, so T is a bijection.
B.6 Ambiguity Aversion
Proof of Corollary 4.1








































and so A is non-positive. Finally, A is clearly also concave.
Conversely, suppose that A is concave (hence, also non-positive). Then I is concave, so for all f ,g 2 L0 with
f  g, I(u [f +(1 )g]) I(u f ).
Proof of Proposition 4.2
(3) ) (1) is immediate (consider the EU preference determined by p and u). To see that (3) , (2), note






























u  ¯ f dm)=u(z)+A(
R
u f dm), because
R
u  ¯ f dm= 
R
u f dm
and A is symmetric; hence, the required ranking obtains iff A(
R
u  f dm)0.
Turn now to (1) ) (3). Suppose that ¼ is more ambiguity-averse than some EU preference relation ¼0. By
Corollary B.3 in [22], one can assume that ¼0 is represented by the non-constant utility u on X. Arguing by con-
tradiction, suppose that there is f 2 L0 such that A(
R
u  f dm) > 0. Let 
 2 R be such that 
 u  f 2 B0(,u(X)),
and ¯ f 2 L0 such that u  ¯ f = 
 u  f . Then A(
R
u  ¯ f dm) = A(
R
u  f dm) > 0; furthermore,
1
2u  f +
1



























































¯ f ¼0 1
2x +
1
2 ¯ x; hence, z ¼0 1
2x +
1
2 ¯ x, a contradiction.





¯ f z ¼ f iff A(
R





¯ f z 2X: then, since f  ¯ f and these acts have
the same adjustments,
R
u  f dp =
R





¯ f  z ¼ f if and only
if u(z)u(z)+A(
R
u  f dm)=
R
u  f dp+A(
R
u  f dm).
The Claim immediately shows that (3) implies (4). For the converse, assume that Axiom 4.3 and consider the
cases (a) ¼ satisﬁes C-Independence or (b) u(X) is unbounded. In case (a), then I is positively homogeneous, so if
' =
R
a dm for some a 2 B(,u(X)) and  > 0, then A(') = ^ I(a)  J(a) = [^ I(a)  J(a)] = A('): that is, A is
also positively homogeneous. In this case, it is wlog to assume that u(X)  [ 1,1] and prove the result for f 2 L0
such that ku  f k 
1
3. This ensures the existence of ¯ f 2 L0 such that u  ¯ f =  u  f , as well as g, ¯ g 2 L0 such that
u  g = u  f  
R
u  f dp and u  ¯ g = u  ¯ f  
R
u  ¯ f dp =  u  g. By construction, (g, ¯ g) are complementary and
g  ¯ g, because
R
u  g dp =
R
u  ¯ g dp = 0. The above Claim implies that A(
R
u  f dm) = A(
R
u  g dm)  0, as
required.
In case (b), suppose u(X) is unbounded below (the other case is treated analogously). Consider f 2 L0 and
construct ¯ f 2 L0 such that u  ¯ f = min u  f (
)+max u  f (
)  f . Then f , ¯ f are complementary. If f  ¯ f , then
the Claim sufﬁces to prove the result. Otherwise, let  =
R
u  f dp 
R
u  ¯ f dp. If  > 0, consider f 0 2 L0 such that
u  f 0 = u  f  : then
R
u  f 0dp =
R
u  ¯ f dp and f 0, ¯ f are complementary, so f 0  ¯ f and the Claim implies that
A(
R
u  f dm) = A(
R
u  f 0dm)  0. If instead  < 0, consider f 0 such that u  f 0 = ¯ f  , so again f  f 0 and the
Claim can be invoked to yield the required conclusion.
B.7 Updating
For a,b 2 B0(,u(X)), denote by aEb the element of B0(,u(X)) that coincides with a on E and with b elsewhere.
Proof of Remark 4.1.
Only if: it will be shown that, for any event E 2 , p(E) = 0 implies I(a) = I(b) for all a,b 2 B0(,u(X)) such
that a(!) = b(!) for ! 62 E. To see this, assume wlog that I(a)  I(b), and let  = maxfmax a(
),max b(
)g
and  = minfmin a(
),min b(
)g. Then monotonicity implies that I(Ea)  I(a)  I(b)  I(Eb) = I(Ea).





nE a dp =
R
Ea dp, so if I(Ea) > I(Ea), it must be the case that A(
R




=+, as usual 
 Ea,





























































which is a violation of monotonicity, as 
 = <=
 .
If: suppose that p(E) > 0, and ﬁx x,y 2 X with x  y. If xEy  y, we are done. Otherwise, note that xEy  y,
i.e. [u(x)   u(y)]p(E) + A([u(x)   u(y)]m(E)) = 0, implies A([u(x)   u(y)]m(
 n E)) = A([u(x)   u(y)]m(E)) =
 [u(x) u(y)]p(E); hence,







nE) p(E)=1 2p(E)<1 as p(E)>0. Thus, x y Ex, and again Axiom 4.4 holds.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Since E is not null, p(E)>0, so p(jE) is well-deﬁned. Begin with the following
Claim: If (f , ¯ f ) is a complementary pair, f and ¯ f are constant on 














holds if and only if u(f (!))=
R
u  f dp=
R
E u  f dp(jE) for all !2
nE.
Proof of the Claim: Let 







2u( ¯ f (!)) for all ! 2 
; also let  = u(f (!)) and
 =u( ¯ f (!)) for any (hence all) !2
nE. Then u  ¯ f =
 u  f and  =





















































































u  f dm

,
where the last equality uses the fact that
R
u  ¯ f dm =  
R










2 f (!) holds if and only if  =
R
u  f dp. Furthermore,
R
u  f dp =
R
E u  f dp+p(
nE), so it follows that
=
R
E u  f dp(jE) as well.
46Next, note that the tuple of set functions mE =(mi,E)0i<n deﬁned by Eq. (7) is easily seen to be an element of
Mn
1(); in particular, for all F 2, jmi,E(F)jjmi(F \E)j+jmi(
nE)jN(F \E)+N(
nE) for all i, and if (Fk)#;,
then sup0i<n jmi,E(F)jsup0i<n jmi(Fk \E)j+p(FkjE)N(
nE)!0. Furthermore, mE(E)=m(E)+p(EjE)m(
n
E) = 0 as well. Note also that, for all a 2 B(),
R





n E); this is immediate for
indicator functions, holds by linearity on B0(), and extends to B() by continuity.















































E b dmE), as required.
Now suppose (1) holds. Fix f ,g, ¯ f , ¯ g 2 L0 as in Axiom 4.6. By the Claim, u  f (!)=
R
E u  f dp(jE)=
R
u  f dp
and u  g(!)=
R
E u  g dp(jE)=
R
u  g dp for all !2
nE. Then the Axiom implies that f ¼E g iff f Eg, i.e. iff
Z
u  f dp+A
Z




u  g dp+A
Z





u  f dp(jE)+A
Z
E









u  g dp(jE)+A
Z
E









u  f dp(jE)+A
Z
E





u  g dp(jE)+A
Z
E
u  g dmE

.
If now f ,g 2 L0 are arbitrary, let x,y 2X be such that u(x)=
R
E u  f dp(jE) and u(y)=
R
E u g dp(jE). Notice that
then
R
u  f Ex dp =
R
E u  f Ex dp(jE) = u(x), and similarly for gEy. Finally, let f 0,g 0 be such that (f Ex, f 0) and
(gEy,g 0) are complementary; notice that this requires that f 0,g 0 be constant on 
nE. Then, by the Claim, the acts
f Ex, f 0,gEy,g 0 satisfy all the assumptions of Axiom 4.6, and the preceding argument just given shows that then
f Ex ¼E gEy iff
R
E u f dp(jE)+A(
R
E u f dmE)
R
E u g dp(jE)+A(
R
E u g dmE). ButbyAxiom4.5, f Ex ¼E gEy
iff f ¼E g, so (2) holds.
In the opposite direction, assume that (2) holds. It is then immediate that Axiom 4.5 is satisﬁed. Now assume





for all ! 2 
 n E, so
R
E u  f dp(jE) + A(
R
E u  f dmE) = p(E)
R
E u  f dp(jE) + p(
 n E)u(f (!)) + A(
R




u  f dp+A(
R
u  f dm), and similarly
R
E u g dp(jE)+A(
R





g dm), so that Axiom 4.6 holds.





47B.8 Proof of Proposition 4.4
(1) follows immediately from Lemma B.10. For (2), notice that the Choquet integral is positively homogeneous;




2I( a) for all a 2 B0(). If ¼ sat-
isﬁes Complementary Independence, then, using the VEU representation, I(1E) = p(E)+A(m(E)) and I( 1E) =
 p(E)+A( m(E)) =  p(E)+A(m(E)), so I(1E)  I( 1E) = 2p(E). On the other hand, using the CEU represen-
tation, Iv(E) = v(E) and Iv( 1E) =  [1   v(
 n E)]; since I = Iv, the claim follows. In the opposite direction,
suppose that a =
PK
k=1k1Ek for a partition E1,...,EK of 






































































2I( a) = J(a), where J is the linear functional represented by p. The claim now follows from
Lemma B.8.
B.9 Proof of Proposition 4.5
The preference ¼ has a niveloidal representation Ic,u, where Ic(a) = minq2ba1()
R
a dq+c(q). For conciseness,
say that c is symmetric around p 2ba1() iff it satisﬁes the condition in Prop. 4.5. By Lemma B.8, Axiom 3.7 holds








 a) is afﬁne. Thus it sufﬁces to show that J is afﬁne iff
c is symmetric around p.





¯ f (!)z; thus, a u f =2u(z) u  ¯ f 
 u  ¯ f . Now letq 2argminq2ba1()
R
a dq+c(q); since clearly


























Since anyq 2ba1() such that 2p q 2ba1() can obviously be written asq =2p [2p q], and all otherq 2ba1()
have c(q) = 1, it follows that Ic(






 + c(2p  q) = 
   2
R











a dp, i.e. J is afﬁne and represented by p.








a dp for all a,
 a 2 B0(); also, for every






u(f (!)), and recall that u(x f ) = Ic(u  f ).






u  f d(2p  q)= 2
Z
u  f dp+sup
f 2L0
Ic(u  f ) 
Z
( u  f )dq=
= 2
Z




u  f dp+Ic(2u(m f ) u  f ) 2u(m f ) 
Z
( u  f )dq=
= sup
f 2L0
Ic(2u(m f ) u  f ) 
Z
[2u(m f ) u  f ]dq= sup
f 2L0
Ic(u  f ) 
Z
u  f dq=c
(q);
the last step follows because, for every f 2 L0, there is ¯ f 2 L0 such that u  ¯ f = 2u(m f )   u  f , and therefore
computing the supremum over f 2 L0 is the same as computing it over the complementary acts ¯ f constructed














u  f d(2p  q)= sup
f 2L0
Ic(u  f ) 
Z












which contradicts c(q) < 1. The second equality follows from the fact that 2p(
)   q(
) = 1, and the sec-
ond inequality follows from monotonicity of Ic; the ﬁnal equality uses the fact that u(X) is unbounded and
2p(E) q(E)<0.
B.10 Probabilistic Sophistication for VEU preferences
An induced likelihood ordering ¼` is represented by a probability  2 ca1() iff, for all E,F 2 , E ¼` F iff (E) 
(F). Finally, a probability measure  is convex-ranged iff, for every event E 2  such that (E) > 0, and for every
2(0,1), there exists A 2 such that A  E and (A)=(E).
Proposition B.15 Fix a VEU preference relation ¼ and let p 2 ca1() be the corresponding baseline probability. If
the induced likelihood ordering ¼` is represented by a convex-ranged probability measure 2ca1(), then =p1.
Proof: Fix x,y 2 X with x  y. Since the ranking of bets xEy is represented by  and also by the map deﬁned by
E 7!u(x)p(E)+u(y)p(Ec)+A([u(x) u(y)]m(E)), there exists an increasing function g :[0,1]![u(y),u(x)] such
49that u(x)p(E)+u(y)p(Ec)+A([u(x) u(y)]m(E))= g((E)) for all events E [this function g will in general depend
upon x and y, but this is inconsequential]. Hence, recalling that m(
nE)= m(E) and A is symmetric,
g((E))  g(1 (E))=[u(x) u(y)](2p(E) 1) (24)
for all events E 2 . Since g is increasing, so is the map 
 7! g(
)   g(1   
); thus, (E) = (F) if and only if







n for all j =1,...,n; correspondingly, p(En
j )=p(En




j =1,...,n. This implies that, for every event E such that (E) is rational, p(E)=(E).
Toextendthisequalitytoarbitraryevents,notethat,foreveryevent E suchthat(E)>0andnumberr <(E),
since  is convex-ranged, there exists L  E such that (L) =
r
(E)(E) = r. Similarly, for every event E such that
(E) < 1 and number r > (E), there exists an event U  E such that (U) = r: to see this, note that (
nE) > 0
and 1 r <(
nE), so there exists L 
nE such that (L)=1 r; hence,U =
nL has the required properties.
Now consider sequences of rational numbers f`ngn0  [0,1] and fungn0  [0,1] such that `n " (E) and
un # (E); by the preceding argument, for every n  1 there exist sets Ln  E  Un such that (Ln) = `n and
(Un) = un. It was shown above that p(Ln) = (Ln) and p(Un) = (Un); moreover, Ln  E  Un implies that
p(Ln)p(E)p(Un). Therefore, p(E)=(E), as required.
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